KEHUTANAN DALAM KERANGKA OTONOMI DAERAH

GUNA MEWUJUDKAN SUPREMASI HUKUM

1.    PENDAHULUAN

Pemberlakuan Undang-undang (UU No. 22 tahun 1999 tentang Daerah (lebih popular disebut UU Otonomi Daerah/Otda) pada tahun 2001, yang telah diperbaharui dengan UU No. 32 tahun 2004, merupakan tonggak baru dalam sistem pemerintahan Indonesia. Dengan diberlakukannya UU tersebut menandakan dimulainya era otonomi daerah yang memberikan wewenang seluas-luasnya kepada pemerintah Daerah beserta seluruh komponen masyarakat setempat untuk mengatur daerahnya dengan cara sendiri, sesuai peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku.[1]

Dalam hal pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam, di era Otda banyak hal ini menimbulkan banyak permasalahan. Keinginan Pemda untuk menghimpun pendapatan asli daerah (PAD), telah menguras sumber daya alam potensial yang ada, tanpa mempertimbangkan dampak negatif/ kerusakan lingkungan dan prinsip pembangunan berkelanjutan (sustainable development). Pemahaman terhadap Otda yang keliru, baik oleh aparat maupun oleh warga masyarakat menyebabkan pelaksanaan Otda menyimpang dari tujuan mewujudkan masyarakat yang aman, damai dan sejahtera. Pemerintah Daerah pun membuat berbagai macam Perda yang terkadang bertentangan baik dengan Perda daerah lain maupun dengan peraturan perundang-undangan lainnya yang sifatnya lebih tinggi. Bahkan sampai tahun 2007 saja terdapat 1.850 Perda bermasalah yangsedang dalam peninjauan hukum.[2]

Dampak dari situasi ini semuanya bermuara salah satu diantaranya kepada kewenangan penyelenggaraan urusan kehutanan seiring pemberlakuan UU Otonomi Daerah (Otda). Terjadi distorsi hukum antara Peraturan Daerah (Perda) yang mengacu kepada UU Otda dengan pengelolaan hutan oleh pemerintah pusat yang berlandaskan kepada UU Kehutanan. Friksi kepentingan Pusat-Daerah pada akhirnya menimbulkan akibat hukum baik terhadap subyek hukum (masyarakat) maupun obyek hukum (Peraturan Perundang-undangan). Akibatnya adalah pada tugas penegakan hukum oleh Polri. Bila terjadi pelanggaran hukum atas peraturan perundang – undangan di bidang kehutanan Polri harus mempunyai pedoman yang jelas dalam penegakannya sebab terkadang perbuatan tersebut melanggar undang-undang atau peraturan yang satu, tetapi diperbolehkan / diijinkan oleh undang – undang atau peraturan yang lain.

Tulisan ini dimaksudkan untuk membahas tentang kewenangan daerah dalam penyelenggaraan hutan seiring dengan paradigma Otonomi Daerah serta konflik hukum yang terjadi dengan hukum lainnya yang mengatur tentang Kehutanan. Dalam tulisan ini juga akan dibahas tentang upaya antisipasi Polri terhadap konflik hukum yang terjadi di bidang hukum kehutanan

1. 2. PEMBAHASAN
   1. a. Otonomi Daerah dan Pengelolaan Hutan

Otonomi Daerah adalah hak, kewenangan dan kewajiban daerah otonom untuk mengatur dan mengurus pemerintahan dan kepentingan masyarakat setempat sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan (UU No. 32/2004, Pasal 1 ayat [5]). Dalam UU No. 32/2004, Pasal 1 ayat (2), disebutkan bahwa Pemerintahan Daerah adalah penyelenggaraan urusan pemerintahan oleh pemerintah daerah dan DPRD menurut asas otonomi dan tugas pembantuan dengan prinsip otonomi seluas-luasnya dalam sistem dan prinsip Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.

Otonomi Daerah adalah hak, kewenangan dan kewajiban daerah otonom untuk mengatur dan mengurus pemerintahan dan kepentingan masyarakat setempat sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan (UU No. 32/2004, Pasal 1 [5]). Dalam otonomi daerah tersebut terdapat pembagian urusan pemerintahan yang diberikan kepada pemerintah daerah secara luas, kecuali dalam hal urusan : (1) politik luar negeri, (2) pertahanan, (3) keamanan, (4) yustisi, (5) moneter dan fiskal nasional dan (6) agama (Pasal 10, UU No. 32/2004), yang masih menjadi urusan pemerintah pusat, karena menyangkut kelangsungan hidup dan kedaulatan negara serta hubungannya dengan pergaulan dunia internasional.

Berkait dengan pengelolaan sumber daya alam setempat dalam hal ini kehutanan, hal ini merupakan sebuah sistem pengurusan kawasan hutan dan pengelolaan hasil hutan. Ketentuan ini secara konstitusional termaktub dalam Pasal 33 ayat (3) UUD 1945 (dan perubahannya) yang berbunyi: “Bumi dan air dan kekayaan alam yang terkandung di dalamnya dikuasai oleh negara dan dipergunakan untu sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat”. Dalam kaitannya dengan penyelenggaraan kehutanan, kewenangan di sini mengandung arti hak dan kewajiban untuk menyelenggarakan kehutanan. Namun, siapa atau institusi mana yang mempunyai kewenangan dalam menyelenggarakan urusan kehutanan, tentu harus dikembalikan pada instrumen hukum yang mengaturnya. Dalam hal ini, terdapat 2 (dua) instrumen hukum dalam bentuk UU yang memberikan justifikasi kewenangan bagi satuan-satuan pemerintahan yang ada, yaitu:

1)        Dalam perspektif Otonomi Daerah adalah Undang Undang No. 32 tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintah Daerah. Kehutanan adalah bidang yang tidak termasuk dalam urusan 6 jenis urusan pmerintahan yang tidak diserahkan ke pemerintah daerah. Artinya, daerah tidak hanya berwenang mengatur urusan kehutanan, tetapi juga berwenang mengurus hutan dan memperoleh manfaat dari usaha tersebut.[3]

2)        Dalam perspektif hukum kehutanan adalah Undang Undang No. 41 tahun 1999 tentang Kehutanan. Dalam UU tersebut secara tegas disebutkan dikuasai oleh negara dan kewenangan pengaturan dan pengurusan kehutanan diserahkan pada pemerintah pusat, sebagaimana tercantum dalam Pasal 4 UU No. 41/ 1999.

Pasal 4 UU no 41 / 1999.

(1)   Semua hutan di wilayah Republik Indonesia termasuk kekayaan alam yang terkandung didalamnya dikuasai negra dan digunakn sebsar-besarnya untuk kemakmuran rakyat.

(2)   Penguasaan hutan oleh negara sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat 1 memberi wewenang pada Pemerintah untuk:

1. Mengatur dan mengurus segal sesuatu yang berkaitan dengan hutan, kawsan hutan dan hasil hutan.
2. Menetapkan status wilayah tertentu sebagai kawasn hutan atau sebagai bukan kawasan hutan.
3. Mengatur dan menetapkan hubungan-hubungan hukum antara orang denga hutan serta mengatur perbuatan hukum mengenai kehutanan.

Paradigma Otonomi Daerah sebagaimana tersurat dalam UU Pemerintah Daerah  dan UU Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat-Daerah adalah berkenaan dengan otonomi seluas-luasnya sebagai dasar bagi penyelenggaraan pemerintah sebagaimana yang diamanatkan Undang Undang tersebut. Dengan demikian secara yuridis normatif pada asasnya urusan pemerintahan di bidang kehutanan harus masuk dalam urusan rumah tangga daerah. Namun hal ini akan terjadi kontradiktif manakala dikaitkan dengan kewenangan Pusat sebagaiman diatur dalam UU Kehutanan No 41 tahun 1999 dimana kewenangan Pusat termasuk juga wewenang menetapkan kebijakan, antara lain pendayagunaan sumber daya alam.

Kerancuan seperti ini merupakan sumber perselisihan antara Pusat dan Daerah, seperti yang pernah terjadi antara Daerah Propinsi Jawa Barat dengan Departemen Kehutanan (cq. Perhutani Jawa Barat) sebagai akibat keluarnya Perda No. 19 tahun 2001 tentang Pengurusan Hutan dan No. 20 tahun 2001 tentang Peredaran Hasil Hutan. Dengan Perda tersebut maka pengelolaan hasil hutasn di Provinsi Jawa Barat diserahkan kepada Dinas Kehutanan, padahal pemerintah pusat dalam hal ini Departemen Kehutanan telah menunjuk Perhutani Jawa Barat untuk mengelola hutan Jawa Barat tersebut. Dapat dibayangkan konflik hukum yang terjadi bila Dinas Kehutanan Jawa Barat dan Perhutani memberikan ijin kepada dua perusahaan yang berbeda untuk mengelola hutan (Hak Penguasaan Hutan / HPH) di suatu kawasan hutan yang sama. Tentu kedua perusahaan pemegang HPH tersebut akan saling melaporkan penyerobotan atau pencurian hasil hutan.

1. b. Sikap Polri terhadap Konflik Hukum

Mengacu kepada kemungkinan terjadinya perselisihan hukum yang pada akhirnya memasuki ranah tugas Polri sesuai UU No. 2/ 2002, maka Polri harus tetap profesional tegas dan obyektif. Materi perselisihan yang dimaksud adalah pemahaman tentang UU Kehutanan dan UU Pemerintah Daerah (yang sering disebut sebagai UU Otonomi Daerah). Polri harus mencermati dalam menyikapi pelaksanaan kedua undang undang tersebut, yang sangat dimungkinkan terjadinya tindak pelanggaran hukum khususnya menyangkut pasal-pasal yang termaktub dalam UU No. 41/ 1999 tentang Kehutanan. Tindak pidana yang dimaksud adalah timbulnya pelanggaran hukum yang ditengarai masuk dalam kategori illegal logging.

Pemda berdasar kewenangannya dapat mengatur pemanfaatan sumber daya alam di wilayahnya guna kemakmuran masyarakat dalam konteks Otonomi Daerah mengacu kepada ketentuan UU Otda. Sedangkan, Polri melihat sebagai suatu tindak pidana di bidang kehutanan sesuai bunyi pasal-pasal pada UU no. 41/ 1999.

Kondisi ini memang menjadikan confuse apabila berpegang hanya pada UU Kehutanan. Pemda sendiri tetap bersikeras bahwa tindakannya bukan merupakan kategori penyimpangan hukum, karena secar jelas telah berlandaskan pada kewenangan yang telah diberikan oleh UU Otda.

Menyikapi kondisi tersebut, maka upaya Polri dalam menegakkan hukum guna terwujudnya supremasi hukum dilakukan langkah hukum sebagai berikut:

1)    Melaksanakan tugas pokok dan fungsinya sesuai amanat UU No. 2/ 2002 tentang Polri secara profesional.

2)    Melaksanakan proses penegakan hukum sesuai dengan aturan beracara pidana yang berlandaskan kepada UU No. 8/ 1081 tentang KUHAP.

3)    Melandasi kinerja penegakan hukum sesuai ajaran tertib hukum yaitu:

a)    Dalam hal peraturan perundang-undangan tingkatan lebih rendah bertentangan dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang tingkatannya lebih tinggi, peraturan prundang-undangan tingkatan lebih rendah dapat dibatalkan dan dapat dinyatakan batal demi hukum. Hal ini sesuai dengan azas hukum lex superiori derogat lex inferior. Hal ini juga sesuai denganTap MPR No 3 tahun 2000 dan UU No 10 tahun 2004 tentang Tata Urutan Perundangan.

b)    Dalam hal peraturan perundang – undangan yang setara atau sederajat maka berlaku perturan perundang-undangan yang lama lebih dikesampingkan (lex posteriori derogat legi priori).

c)    Dalam hal peraturan perundang-undangan yang mengatur bidang-bidang kekhususan dari bidang-bidang yang diatur oleh peraturan perundang-undangan yang sederajat maka berlaku peraturan perundang-undangan yang mengatur bidang khusus tersebut (lex specialis derogat legi generalis).

Dengan konstruksi pemikiran tersebut, maka tidak ada keragu-raguan Polri dalam penegakan hukum menyangkut perselisihan paham dalam hukum khususnya yang berimplikasi terhadap pelanggaran hukum dalam bentuk tindak pidana (bukan pelanggaran administratif). Polri akan tetap berpegang teguh kepada ketentuan perundangan yang berlaku sesuai kompetensi yang dimiliki dalam kerangka Sistem Peradilan Pidana (Criminal Justice System) Indonesia.

Dalam menghadapi pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah, maka Polri dalam hal ini adalah para Manajer Senior ditingkat Polres (atau para Kapolres) dituntut kesiapan dan persiapannya agar dalam pelaksanaannya tidak “terdadak” dan menjadi tidak siap.    Untuk itu perlu adanya langkah-langkah dalam mengelola atau mengatur organisasinya sehingga sumber daya yang ada di kesatuannya mampu melaksanakan tugas dengan baik. Mempersiapkan sumber daya manusia Polri ditingkat KOD (Polres) diperlukan satu langkah-langkah manajerial yang baik. Langkah-langkah itu diawali dari perencanaan yang matang berkenan dengan penyiapan dan kesiapan sumber daya Polri. Penyiapan sumber daya manusia Polri sendiri harus dilaksanakan secara terus menerus dan berkesinambungan, tidak boleh terputus. Hal itu untuk mendapatkan insan-insan Polri yang mempunyai kemampuan, ketrampilan dan pengetahuan yang profesioanl sesuai bidang tugasnya.

1. 3. KESIMPULAN

a.       Otonomi Daerah dan Pengelolaan Hutan oleh Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah terjadi tarik menarik kepentingan. Hal ini merupakan dampak dari manfaat hutan itu sendiri sebagai sebagai sumber pendapatan asli daerah dalam kerangka otonomi daerah. Dampak yang terjadi adalah timbulnya perselisihan hukum antara produk hukum Pusat dengan produk hukum Daerah berkait dengan kewenangan pengelolaan Hutan dan Kehutanan.

b.       Implikasi hukum dalam perkembangan otonomin daerah adalah kontradiksi antara Undang Undang No. 22 tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintah Daerah sebagaimana telah diubah dengan UU No. 32 tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintah Daerah dengan Undang Undang No. 41 tahun 1999 tentang Kehutanan. Implikasi hukum ini sebagai dampak terjadinya tarik menarik kepentingan dalam pemanfaatan hasil hutan.

c.       Upaya Polri dalam menyikapi perselisihan hukum tersebut sebatas pada terjadinya tindak pidana pelanggaran UU No. 41 tahun 1999 tentang Kehutanan. Tindak pidana yang terjadi sering dikategorikan sebagai illegal logging. Peran Polri dalam melaksanakan penegakan hukum tersebut haruslah berpedoman pada azas – azs hukum agar dapat mewujudkan supremasi hukum, di samping menyiapkan SDM Polri yang profesional mengacu kepada peraturan perundang-undangan yang berkorelasi terhadap kompetensinya dalam kerangka Sistem Peradilan Pidana Indonesia.

[2] Pemerintah Kota Makassar, 1.850 Peraturan Tumpang Tindih , 24 April 2007 http://makassarkota.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=186&date=2008-03-01

[3] I Gde Pantja Astawa, Problematika Hukum Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia, Bandung, Alumni, 2009. Hal. 4-13.

1. 1. PENDAHULUAN

Kata “demokrasi” berasal dari dua kata, yaitu demos yang berarti “rakyat”, dan kratos/ cratein yang berarti “pemerintahan”, sehingga dapat diartikan sebagai pemerintahan rakyat, atau yang lebih kita kenal sebagai pemerintahan dari rakyat, oleh rakyat dan untuk rakyat. Konsep demokrasi menjadi sebuah kata kunci tersendiri dalam bidang ilmu politik. Hal ini menjadi wajar, sebab demokrasi saat ini disebut-sebut sebagai indikator perkembangan politik suatu negara. Dalam ucapan Abraham Lincoln, demokrasi adalah suatu pemerintahan “dari rakyat, oleh rakyat dan untuk rakyat.”[1]

Dalam perkembangan demokrasi di Indonesia, telah mengalami beberapa kali perubahan sejalan dengan perkembangan sistem politik dan budaya serta Pimpinan negara. Model demokrasi yang pernah dialami Indonesia adalah Demokrasi Liberal/ Parlementer, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Demokrasi Pancasila. Setiap perubahan model demokrasi dari yang satu menuju yang lainnya mengalami masa transisi, pada masa ini terdapat kerawanan yang tinggi karena perubahan tidak serta merta diikuti oleh semua unsur/ elemen/ aspek pemerintahan terutama pola kehidupan masyarakat. Kerawanan yang timbul merupakan ancaman terhadap keamanan dalam negeri yang apabila tidak dilakukan upaya penanggulangan secara baik akan mengakibatkan banyak kerugian bagi masyarakat, bangsa dan Negara. Peran dan fungsi Polri sebagai pemelihara kamtibmas menjadi penting karena Polri harus mampu mewujudkan kemanan dan ketertiban masyarakat (kamtibmas). Hal ini merupakan konsekuensi logis Polri sebagai aparat negara yang melindungi, mengayomi dan melayani masyarakat serta sebagai penegak hukum.

Namun demikian perkembangan poltik terutama pasca reformasi 1998 juga mewarnai keberadaan Polri dalam melaksanakan tugasnya sebagai pemelihara kamtibmas. Dalam sejarah Polri, diketahui bahwa Polri pernah terlibat dalam arus pusaran perpolitikan nasional. Konflik Internal Polri pada Era Presiden Gus Dur, peristiwa Kapolwil Banyumas yang terkenal dengan “video Polres Banjarnegara”, pada Pemilu 2004, serta peristiwa adalah mundurnya Kapolda Jatim pada kasus penggelembungan DPT Pilkada ulangan di Madura yang kemudian menjadi polemik saat ini. Beberapa permasalahan tersebut merupakan bukti bagaimana peta poltik nasional mempengaruhi peran dan kedudukan Polri.

Tulisan ini dimaksudkan untuk membahas dampak dari proses demokrasi pasca reformasi (1998-sekarang) pada aspek kamtibmas. Sehingga permasalahan dalam tulisan ini yaitu “Bagaimanakah pengaruh proses Demokrasi Indonesia Pasca Reformasi terhadap tugas Polri dalam pemeliharaan kamtibmas?”. Sedangkan persoalan-persoalan yang muncul adalah :

a.Bagaimana sistem politik dan demokrasi Indonesia Pasca Reformasi (1998-sekarang) dan apa implikasinya terhadap situasi kamtibmas?

1. Bagaimana strategi Polri di tingkat KOD dalam menyikapi implikasi tersebut dalam konteks peran dan kedudukannya sebagai pemelihara kamtibmas?

1. 2. PEMBAHASAN
2. a. Sistem Politik dan Demokrasi Indonesia Pasca Reformasi

Sistem politik adalah tata cara dalam menjalankan sebuah organisasi pemerintah suatu negara sesuai kehendak rakyatnya. Sistem politik akan dipengaruhi dan mempengaruhi sistem-sistem ekonomi, sistem sosial, sistem pendidikan dan teknologi, dan sistem etnik kebudayaan masyarakatnya.[2]

Indonesia adalah negara kesatuan berbentuk Republik, dimana kedaulatan berada di tangan rakyat dan dijalankan sepenuhnya oleh Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR). Indonesia menganut sistem pemerintahan presidensil, di mana Presiden berkedudukan sebagai kepala negara sekaligus kepala pemerintahan. Indonesia pernah menjalani sistem pemerintahan federal di bawah Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) selama tujuh bulan (27 Desember 1949-17 Agustus 1950), namun kembali ke bentuk pemerintahan republik. Setelah jatuhnya Orde Baru (1966-1997), pemerintah merespon desakan daerah-daerah terhadap sistem pemerintahan yang bersifat sangat sentralistis, dengan menawarkan konsep Otonomi Daerah untuk mewujudkan desentralisasi kekuasaan.[3]

Runtuhnya rejim Otoriter Orde Baru membawa harapan bagi tumbuhnya demokrasi di Indonesia. Bergulirnya reformasi yang mengiringi runtuhnya rezim tersebut menandakan tahap awal bagi transisi demokrasi Indonesia. Transisi demokrasi merupakan fase yang krusial dan kritis karena dalam fase ini akan ditentukan kemana arah demokrasi yang akan dibangun. Selain itu fase ini bisa saja terjadi pembalikan arah perjalanan bangsa dan Negara kembali ke masa otoriter.

Implementasi demokrasi Indonesia pasca reformasi dipengaruhi oleh perkembangan sistem politik dan demokrasi global maupun regional yang memberikan warna tersendiri dengan ditandai oleh beberapa perubahan-perubahan secara signifikan dalam aspek sistem atau perundang-undangan yang berkaitan dengan politik dan demokrasi di Indonesia antara lain:

1)         Kebebasan untuk mendirikan partai politik sebagaimana dijamin dalam UU no 2 tahun 2008 tentang Partai Politik dimana partai politik dapat didirikan hanya oleh 50 orang WNI yang telah berusia diatas 21 tahun

2)                  Perubahan terhadap sistem Pemilihan Umum sebagaimana diatur dalam UU No. 22 tahun 2007 tentang Penyelenggaraan Pemilu, UU No 10 tahun 2008 tentang Pemilu legislatif dan UU no 42 tahun 2008 tentang pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden secara langsung oleh rakyat yang menunjukan kedaulatan rakyat sepenuhnya.

3)                   Diberlakukannya UU No. 9 Tahun 1999, tentang kebebasan mengeluarkan pendapat di muka umum yang berpotensi aksi unjuk rasa dari berbagai komponen masyarakat, apabila pemerintah tidak dapat menjalankan fungsinya sesuai kehendak rakyat atau apabila ada kebijakan yang tidak memihak kepada rakyat.

4)                  Adanya kebebasan pers yang profesional telah memberikan nuansa keterbukaan dimana pers dapat mengontrol secara langsung kinerja dari para pejabat negara sehingga dapat dipantau sampai seberapa jauh telah melaksanakan tugasnya sesuai dengan amanat dan mandat dari rakyat.

5)                  Diberlakukannya UU No. 22, 25 dan 28 Tahun 1999, tentang Otonomi Daerah yang menggambarkan adanya kesempatan rakyat untuk menentukan dan mengelola pemerintahan serta sumber daya secara langsung tanpa harus menunggu petunjuk yang secara sentralistik diberikan oleh penguasa di pusat.

b. Implikasi Sistem Politik Dan Proses Demokrasi Terhadap Situasi Kamtibmas

Perkembangan politik demokrasi banyak mengakibatkan perubahan dalam tata nilai dan pola perilaku kehidupan masyarakat sehari-hari. Perubahan itu dapat menimbulkan arah yang posistif ada pula yang mengarah pada hal yang negatif, sangat tergantung pada bagaimana cara seseorang menalarnya dan juga tergantung pada cara berpikir dalam menanggapinya. Perubahan tata nilai dan pola perilaku kehidupan masyarakat pasti akan menimbulkan gejala/ fenomena baru, dimana tidak semua masyarakat siap menerimanya.

Pada era reformasi, demokrasi mulai berjalan namun tidak sesuai dengan harapan masyarakat. Fenomena silang pendapat dan kecenderungan memaksakan ide/ kehendak atau interest sering bermuara pada konflik yang mengakibatkan instabilitas pada keamanan dalam negeri. Kondisi global juga turut serta mendorong kualitas demokrasi di Indonesia sehingga Indonesia menjadi negara muslin yang demokratis terbesar didunia. Hal ini akan menimbulkan dampak terhadap situasi kamtibmas.

Beberapa implikasi dari perkembangan demokrasi pasaca reformasi tersebut dibidang kemanan antara lain:

1)         Benturan kepentingan, perbedaan pandangan, dan lain-lain yang berpotensi akan menimbulkan konflik yang tidak mustahil diikuti tindakan kekerasan. Semakin ketatnya persaingan maka intensitas konflik dan kekerasan akan semakin luas dan lebar, tidak hanya horizontal bahkan vertikal, hal ini merupakan ancaman bagi stabilitas keamanan dalam negeri.

2)         Unjuk rasa dan mimbar demokrasi yang semakin sering dan begitu bebasnya sehingga terkadang diwarnai dengan tindakan – tindakan anarkis.

3)         Kebebasan pers yang sering merugikan nama baik seseorang akibat dari suatu pemberitaan yang dikatakan sebagai “character assasination” (pembunuhan karakter).

4)         Konflik hasil Pilkada yang sangat berpotensi menimbulkan konflik horizontal antara pendukung kontestan maupun konflik vertikal antara Pemerintah Daerah dan Pemerintah Pusat.

5)         Konflik antar lembaga tinggi negara dan lembaga pemerintahan.

6)         Konflik internal partai politik untuk menentukan pengurus partai.

7)         Berbagai permasalahan terkait dengan Pemilu seperti pengamanan kampanye, penetuan DPT, pengamanan TPS, penghitungan suara, pencalonan legisalatif dan sebagainya.

c.         Kedudukan Polri  Sebagai Dampak Demokrasi  Pasca Reformasi

Berbagai dampak proses demokrasi pada era pasca reformasi tersebut pada akhirnya memasuki ranah kompetensi Polri sebagai aparat negara yang bertugas untuk memelihara kamtibmas. Untuk itu diperlukan adanya suatu strategi tentang peran dan kedudukan Polri dalam pemeliharaan Kamtibmas. Peran dan kedudukan Polri tersebut adalah:

1)         Netralitas Polri

Secara struktural, dalam lembaga kepolisian itu melekat dua kekuasaan, yaitu (1) kekuasaan di bidang hukum, dan (2) kekuasaan di bidang pemerintahan. Kedua kekuasaan tersebut melahirkan tiga fungsi utama polisi, yaitu (1) sebagai penegak hukum diperoleh dari kekuasaan bidang hukum; (2) sebagai penegak keamanan dan ketertiban umum; dan (3) sebagai pelindung, pelayan dan pengayom masyarakat. Dua fungsi terakhir diperoleh dari kekuasaan di bidang pemerintahan.[4]

Terkait dengan ranah perpolitikan nasioanal, dalam melaksanakan tugas tersebut diatas Polri harus tetap bersikap netral. Meskipun harus diakui bahwa kedudukan Polri sebagai alat pemerintahan langsung dibawah Presiden membuat posisi ini rentan dengan pengaruh intervensi ”penguasa” atau Pemerintah. Padahal netralitas Polri itu tidak tergantung dengan posisi di mana, di bawah Presiden atau departemen, karena netralitas itu tergantung pada sikap Polri sendiri dalam memaknai harapan rakyat. Netralitas Polri menjadi sangat penting dalam pemeliharaan Kamtibmas terutama dalam menghadapi berbagai peristiwa politik seperti pemilu dan pilkada.

Secara filosofi, netralitas Polri disebabkan karena kewenangan Polri dalam pemeliharaan Kamtibmas adalah berasal dari Undang – Undang dan bukan dari penguasa. Dengan demikian Polri harus selalu menjaga sikap netralitasnya sehingga tidak dapat dimamfaatkan untuk kepentingan politik atau kekuasaan. Bahkan netralitas itu juga diperkuat dengan aturan yang melarang Polri untuk ikut memilih dalam pilkada maupun Pemilu.

Namun netralitas Polri dalam Pemilu 2009 saat ini diragukan masyarakat terkait dengan mundurnya mantan Kapolda Jawa Timur Irjen Pol Herman Surjadi Sumawiredja dari keanggotaan Polri pasca dihentikannya penyidikan kasus Ketua KPUD Jatim. Kasus ini  menimbulkan pertanyaan besar dari sejumlah kalangan terhadap netralitas institusi Polri menghadapi Pemilu legislatif dan Presiden.[5] Keraguan akan netralitas Polri juga dihembuskan oleh berbagai pihak yang tidak ingin Polri mandiri langsung berada dibawah Presiden. Mereka berupaya menimbulkan opini bahwa akibat berada langsung dibawah Presdien maka Polri tidak lagi netral.[6]

Bila Polri betul – betul netral, maka Polri tidak akan gamang dalam menghadapi dan menangani berbagai permasalahan terkait dengan peristiwa poltik. Polri dapat dengan tegas menyatakan mana yang benar dan mana yang salah. Netralitas Polri akan membuat Polri mampu bekerja sama dengan semua kalangan dan semua partai politik. Dengan demikian maka tugas pemeliharaan kamtibmas akan dapat berjalan secara maksimal.

2)                  Polri Yang Berorientasi kepada Rakyat

Demokrasi dan kemanan nasional sering dianggap sebagai dua hal yang tidak sejalan. Disatu sisi, demokrasi adalah sistem kekuasaan yang memberikan warganya kebebasan untuk mengekspresikan keinginan dan pendapatnya melalui lembaga – lembaga politik yang demokratis. Sementara disisi lain demi sebuah kemanan nasioanal terkadang penguasa atau pemerintah harus mengorbankan hak – hak kebebasan warganya.[7] Dengan demikian proses demokratisasi secara langsung berhadapan dengan upaya pembatasan hak – hak politik. Hal inilah yang terjadi pada era orde baru dimana pemerintah yang otoriter telah menekan sendi – sendi demokrasi bangsa Indonesia.

Dalam tataran antara tugas menjaga keberlangsungan demokrasi dan tugas menjaga kemanan inilah yang membuat peran Polri dalam harkamtibmas menjadi sulit. Contohnya adalah dalam penetapan status “tersangka” kepada aktifis LSM Komite Indonesia Bangkit, Rizal Ramli dan Ferry Julianto dalam kasus terkait unjuk rasa BBM pada sepanjang bulan mei – Juni 2008. Dalam kasus tersebut banyak kecaman yang dialamatkan pada Polri dengan tuduhan bahwa Polri telah menjadi alat penguasa untuk menekan pihak – pihak oposisi sebagai lawan – lawan pemerintah yang sah.[8]

Proses yang paradoksal tersebut memerlukan pengelolaan yang bijak agar tugas pemeliharaan kamtibmas tetap dapat dilakukan tanpa mengorbankan salah satu dari dua kepentingan tersebut yaitu kepentingan kemanan nasional dan keberlangsungan proses demokrasi. Oleh sebab itu Polri harus berkomitmen bahwa dalam melaksanakan tugasnya Polri harus senantiasa berorientasi kepada kepentingan masyarakat dan bukan pada kepentingan penguasa. Hal ini sejalan pula dengan konsep pemolisian di negara demokratis. Dengan berorientasi kepada rakyat maka Polri akan semakin dicintai dan dipercaya oleh masyarakat, dan tugas Harkamtibmas kan menjadi lebih ringan karena partisipasi masyarakat dalam membantu tugas Polri .

Bila hal ini tercapai, maka kondisi Kamtibmas akan semakin kondusif. Dengan kondusifnya kamtibmas maka tentunya pembangunan demi terwujudnya masyrakat Indonesia yang sejahtera akan berjalan dengan lancar.

1. 3. KESIMPULAN
   1. Sistem politik dan demokrasi Indonesia mengacu kepada makna universal yaitu tata pemerintahan yang sepenuhnya merupakan representasi dari kekuasaan rakyat. Perkembangan demokarsi dan sistem Poltik Indonesia pasca reformasi ditandai dengan berubahnya sistem politik, kebebasan pers dan kebebasan mengeluarkan pendapat.
   2. Implikasi dari dari sistem politik dan demokrasi pasaca reformasi mengakibatkan perubahan dalam tata nilai dan pola perilaku kehidupan masyarakat sehari-hari. Hal ini dapat menjadi suatu potensi gangguan kamtibmas bagi Polri pada aspek harkamtibmas.
   3. Strategi harkamtibmas Polri dalam mensikapi implikasi proses politik dan demokrasi tersebut adalah berdiri pada posisi netral dan berpihak kepada rakyat. Dengan demikian maka situasi kamtibmas akan kondusif dan pembangunan akan berjalan lancar.

DAFTAR PUSTAKA

Admin, 2009, Definisi Demokrasi, dalam http://sorak-aceh.or.id/Data/Public-Policy-Advocacy-Division/Definisi-Demo krasi.html

Admin, 2009, Sistem Politik Indonesia, dalam http://72.14.235.132/search?q=cache: rc7kfJSDmxwJ:www.abc.net.au/ra/federasi/tema1/indon_pol_chart.pdf+sistem+politik&cd=3&hl=id&ct=clnk&gl=id

Almond dan Powel, 1978, Comparative Politics: system, process, and policy, 2^nd Ed., Boston, Little Brown and Company.

Prakosa, Adi, Komunikasi Politik dan Sistem Politik, dalam http://adiprakosa.blogspot.com/ 2008/03/ komunikasi-politik-dan-sistyem-politik.html

Shoelhi, Mohammad (editor), 2003, Demokrasi Madina, model Demokrasi cara Rasulullah, Jakarta, Republika.

Umar, Bambang Widodo, Polisi vs Politik dalam Konteks Keamanan Pemilu, dalam http://idsps.org/ publikasi-idsps/makalah/aktor-keamanan-dan-pemilu/

Utomo, Budi, Perkembangan Demokrasi, Civil Society dan Kecenderungan Oligarki Partai Politik, dalam http://pps.fisip.unpad.ac.id/?q=node/126

Winarno, Budi, 2007, Sistem Politik Indonesia Era Reformasi, Yogyakarta, MedPress.

[2] Almond dan Powel, Comparative Politics: system, process, and policy, 2^nd Ed., Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1978. hal. 6.

[3] Sistem Politik Indonesia, dalam http://72.14.235.132/search?q=cache:rc7kfJSDmxwJ:www.abc.net.au/ra/ federasi/tema1/indon_pol_chart.pdf+sistem+politik&cd=3&hl=id&ct=clnk&gl=id

[4] Umar, Bambang Widodo, Polisi vs Politik dalam Konteks Keamanan Pemilu, dalam http://idsps.org/ publikasi-idsps/makalah/aktor-keamanan-dan-pemilu/

[5]Netralitas Polri pada Pemilu 2009,  http://puspen.depdagri.go.id , 18 Maret 2009

[6] “Netralitas Polri Harga Mati”, Majalah Konstan Online, www.majalahkonstan.com

[7] J Kristiadi, “Demokrasi Dan Strategi Keamanan nasional yang Partisipatif “, CSIS, 2006.

[8] , “Rizal Ramli , Kami Korban Penguasa”, http://www.kompas.com3 Agustus 2008.

By: Sambodo Purnomo Yogo. SIK.MTCP

I.          PENDAHULUAN

Perkembangan suatu organisasi kepolisian tidak terlepas dari pengaruh perkembangan lingkungan startegis baik politik, ketatanegaraan, ekonomi maupun sosial budaya suatu negara. Hal itu disebabkan bahwa secara struktural, dalam lembaga kepolisian itu melekat dua kekuasaan, yaitu (1) kekuasaan di bidang hukum, dan (2) kekuasaan di bidang pemerintahan. Kedua kekuasaan tersebut melahirkan tiga fungsi utama polisi, yaitu (1) sebagai penegak hukum diperoleh dari kekuasaan bidang hukum; (2) sebagai penegak keamanan dan ketertiban umum; dan (3) sebagai pelindung, pelayan dan pengayom masyarakat. Dua fungsi terakhir diperoleh dari kekuasaan di bidang pemerintahan.[1] Ketiga fungsi utama kepolisian itu juga menjadi tugas pokok Polri sebagaimana tercantum dalam pasal 13 UU No 2 Tahun 2002, tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

Dalam perkembangan ketatanegaraan di Indonesia, telah mengalami beberapa kali perubahan sejalan dengan perkembangan sistem politik dan pemerintahan negara. Bentuk pemerintahan yang pernah dialami Indonesia antara lain adalah Demokrasi Liberal/ Parlementer, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Era Orde Baru dan Era Reformasi. Perubahan perpolitikan ketatanegaran tersebut juga mempengaruhi sistem kemanan nasional, karena institusi – institusi poltik bukan saja sebagai instrumen kemanan nasioanl tetapi juga sebagai agen yang bertugas menentukan tujuan akhir kebijakan strategi kemanan nasional.[2] Oleh sebab itu peran Polri pun selalu mengalami pasang surut terkait dengan perkembangan politik tersebut.

Pada zaman orde baru, sistem keamanan nasional sangat dipenagruhi oleh peran militer yang sangat besar dalam menajaga situasi kemanan. Bahkan kedudukan Polri sebagai aparat penegak hukum pun berada dibawah Militer. Kedudukan itu membuat Polri tidak mampu berperan secara optimal dalam memelihara Kamtibmas. Setelah reformasi maka terjadi perubahan mendasar dalam kedudukan Polri. Polri terpisah dari TNI dan mempunyai peran yang sangat dominan dalam pemeliharaan Kamtibmas. Dengan perubahan itu maka diharapkan Polri akan lebih optimal dalam menjalankan tugas dan fungsinya dalam memelihara Kamtibmas.

Berdasarkan latar belakang tersebut diatas, maka tulisan ini akan membahas permasalahan tentang perubahan sistem keamanan nasional pasca reformasi dan strategi polri agar perubahan sistem keamanan nasioanl tersebut dapat mengoptimalkan peran Polri dalam pemeliharaan Kamtibmas.

1. II. PEMBAHASAN
   1. 1. Sistem Keamanan Nasional pada Orde Baru dan Pasca Reformasi

Demokrasi dan kemanan nasional sering dianggap sebagai dua hal yang tidak sejalan. Disatu sisi, demokrasi adalah sistem kekuasaan yang memberikan warganya kebebasan untuk mengekspresikan keinginan dan pendapatnya melalui lembaga – lembaga politik yang demokratis. Sementara disisi lain demi sebuah kemanan nasioanal terkadang penguasa atau pemerintah harus mengorbankan hak – hak kebebasan warganya.[3] Dengan demikian proses demokratisasi secara langsung berhadapan dengan upaya pembatasan hak – hak warga masyarakat. Hal inilah yang terjadi pada era orde baru dimana pemerintah yang otoriter telah menekan sendi – sendi demokrasi bangsa Indonesia.

Pada masa orde baru sistem keamanan nasional lebih ditujukan untuk menjaga kelangsungan pemerintahan. Maka dibentuklah berbagai lembaga kemanan yang walaupun bernuansa ”kemanan” namun diawaki oleh militer, seperti Komando Pemulihan Kemanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib) dan Badan kordinasi Stabilitas Nasional (Bakorstanas). Sangat dominannya peran militer semakin terlihat dengan kebijakan ”dwi fungsi ABRI” yaitu ABRI sebagai kekuatan pertahanan dan kemanan serta ABRI sebagai kekuatan sosial politik.

Sedemikian eksesifnya cara – cara pemerintah menciptakan rasa aman bagi negara sehingga masyarakat malah mersakan bahwa terjadi korelasi negatif antara kemanan nasional denagn rasa aman warga masyarakat.Akibatnya negara menjadi ancaman yang menakutkan bagi warga masyarakat.[4]

Pada masa ini pula Polri menjadi ”anak tiri” dalam ABRI. Dari segi anggaran misalnya anggaran Polri pada tahun 1979 misalnya hanya Rp. 4,5 Milyar, sementara harga sebua pesawat Hercules AURI waktu itu berharga Rp. 19 Milyar.[5] Peran pembinaan masyarakat diambil alih oleh peran aparat teritorial Angkatan Darat seperti Kodam, Kodim dan Babinsa. Dalam penegakan hukum Polri banyak sekali diintervensi oleh ABRI. Polri sebagai aparat penegak hukum dididik dan dintegrasikan dalam ABRI sehingga tugasnya hanya menjadi kepanjangan tangan dari militer yang mengabdi pada kepentingan penguasa.Kasus Marsinah adalah salah satu contoh dimana Polri dipaksa untuk melindungi kepentingan dan keselamatan Tentara.

Oleh sebab itu pada saat reformasi, pemisahan Polri dari ABRI menjadi amanat rakyat yang segera dilaksanakan. Sebagai amanat reformasi, semenjak dikeluarkannya TAP MPR No. VI/MPR/2000 tentang Pemisahan TNI dan Polri  dan TAP MPR No. VII/MPR/2000 tentang peran, fungsi dan kedudukan TNI dan Polri maka secara struktural Polri terpisah dari TNI yang militer.Polri pun berubah dari paradigma militer menjadi polisi sipil yang demokratis. Kedudukan Polri pun semakin kuat dengan kemandirian Polri yang berkedudukan langsung dibawah presiden, sebagaimana tecantum dalam pasal 8 UU No 2 Tahun 2002.

Untuk menjawab harapan masyarakat akan Polri yang lebih profesional pasaca kemandirian Polri maka Refomasi Polri pun segera dilaksanakan baik pada bidang struktural, instrumental maupun Kultural. Anggaran Polri bertambah berkali – kali lipat sampai menacapai 44 Triliun di tahun 2009, naik hampir 100% dari anggaran tahun 2008 yang sebesar 23 Triliun.[6] Peran Polri dalam kemanan menjadi semakin besar sehingga Polri menjadi aktor utama dalam pemeliharaan kamtibmas. Namun disisi lain peran militer dalam kemanan menjadi semakin kecil. Militer (TNI) hanya dipernakan dalam upaya pertahanan. Bahkan muncul istilah ”back to barrack” sebagai ungkapan agar TNI tidak lagi berperan dalam hal – hal lain selain dalam pertahanan dan bela negara.

2.         Optimalisasi Peran Polri di tingkat KOD Dalam Harkamtibmas

Momentum kemandirian Polri dan peran Polri yang lebih besar dalam sistem keamanan nasioanal harus dipelihara dengan baik. Polri terutama di tingkat KOD harus mampu menjawab tantangan tersebut dengan melakukan berbagai strategi dan upaya agar pelaksanaan tugas pokok Polri dapat berjalan secara optimal. Strategi tersebut terkait dengan kemandirian Polri dan kedudukan Polri dibawah presiden. Strategi optimalisasi peran Polri dalam Harkamtibmas adalah:

1. a. Implementasi paradigma Kepolisian Sipil

Paradigma adalah sekumpulan norma dan nilai serta pra kondisi yang mempengaruhi perilaku dan tindakan anggota suatu masyarakat.[7] Oleh sebab itu Paradigma Polisi Sipil harus menjadi acuan dari norma dan nilai – nilai yang menjiwai pelaksanaan tugas Polri sehari – hari, termasuk tugas – tugas pelayanan. Ada banyak pendapat para ahli tentang Polisi Sipil. Salah satunya adalah dari Institute For Defense Strategy and Peace Studies (IDSPS). Lembaga ini menberikan definisi dari Polisi Sipil sebagai berikut:

1)                  Polisi Sipil adalah Polisi yang menghormati hak – hak sipil, serta mampu mengawal nilai – nilai sipil seperti demokrasi, akuntabel, transparan dan lain – lain.

2)                  Polisi Sipil mengedepankan pendekatan kemanusian dan padanya melekat sikap budaya yang sopan, santun, ramah, dan persuasif.[8]

Perubahan dari kultur militer ke kultur sipil memerlukan adaptasi yang intensif, tidak saja mengganti atribut atribut yang berbau militer dengan atribut-atribut yang lebih berwajah sipil (civilian style blazer)[9], tetapi juga melalui berbagai upaya organisasi yang meliputi perubahan pada aspek struktural, instrumental maupun kultural. Mewujudkan polisi sipil juga memerlukan perubahan mendasar sikap dan perilaku polisi, yang lebih berorientasi pada kepentingan masyarakat.

Salah satu upaya dalam mewujudkan kepolisian sipil adalah implementasi community Policing. Konsep Community Policing lahir dari kesadaran pihak  kepolisian bahwa dirinya tidak akan mampu menangani kejahatan sendirian. Keterbatasan sumber daya, materi, anggaran dan sebagainya menuntut kepolisian untuk bermitra dengan masyarakat dan bersama-sama masyarakat memecahkan masalah yang terjadi. Dua hal pokok inilah, yaitu Kemitraan (Partnership) dan Pemecahan Masalah (Problem solving) menjadi tiang utama dari Polmas. Dengan implementasi Polmas maka tugas pemeliharaan kamtibmas akan menjadi lebih mudah dan polisi akan semakin dekat dengan rakyat.

1. b. Kepolisian yang tidak beorientasi pada Penguasa tetapi berorientasi pada rakyat.

Harus diakui bahwa kedudukan Polri sebagai alat pemerintahan langsung dibawah Presiden membuat posisi ini rentan dengan pengaruh intervensi ”penguasa” atau Pemerintah. Kesalahan yang terjadi pada jaman orde baru tidak boleh diulangi oleh Polri. Polri harus mampu memperlihatkan sosok sebagai pelindung, penagyom dan pelayan masyarakat dan bukan sebagai alat penguasa.

Namun demikian, dalam tataran antara tugas menjaga keberlangsungan demokrasi sebagai bagian dari kemanan nasioanal dan tugas menjaga kamtibmas, terkadang membuat peran Polri dalam harkamtibmas menjadi sulit. Contohnya adalah dalam penetapan status “tersangka” kepada aktifis LSM Komite Indonesia Bangkit, Rizal Ramli dan Ferry Julianto dalam kasus terkait unjuk rasa BBM pada sepanjang bulan mei – Juni 2008. Dalam kasus tersebut banyak kecaman yang dialamatkan pada Polri dengan tuduhan bahwa Polri telah menjadi alat penguasa untuk menekan pihak – pihak oposisi sebagai lawan – lawan pemerintah yang sah.[10]

Proses yang paradoksal tersebut memerlukan pengelolaan yang bijak agar tugas pemeliharaan kamtibmas tetap dapat dilakukan tanpa mengorbankan salah satu dari dua kepentingan tersebut yaitu kepentingan kemanan nasional dan kepentingan masyarakat.. Oleh sebab itu Polri ditingakt KOD  harus berkomitmen bahwa dalam melaksanakan tugasnya harus senantiasa berorientasi kepada kepentingan masyarakat. Hal ini sejalan pula dengan konsep pemolisian di negara demokratis. Dengan berorientasi kepada rakyat maka Polri akan semakin dicintai dan dipercaya oleh masyarakat, dan tugas Harkamtibmas kan menjadi lebih ringan karena partisipasi masyarakat dalam membantu tugas Polri .

Bila hal ini tercapai, maka kondisi Kamtibmas akan semakin kondusif. Dengan kondusifnya kamtibmas maka tentunya pembangunan demi terwujudnya masyrakat Indonesia yang sejahtera akan berjalan dengan lancar.

1. III. KESIMPULAN
   1. Perubahan sistem keamanan nasioanal pasca reformasi memberikan kesempatan bagi Polri untuk lebih berperan dalam memelihara kamtibmas. Momentum ini harus terus dijaga agar Polri dapat menjawab harapan masyarakat akan Polri yang lebih profesional dan tidak mengulangi pola pembinaan keamanan nasioanl pada masa orde baru yang otoriter dan menekan nilai – nilai demokrasi.
   2. Optimalisasi peran Polri dalam pemeliharaan Kamtibmas dilakukan melalui dua strategi yaitu implementasi Kepolisian sipil dan Polri yang lebih beorientasi pada kepentingan masyarakat. Bila kedua hal ini dapat dilaksanakan maka situasi Kamtibmas akan menjadi kondusif dan Polri akan semakin dicintai oleh rakyat.

[1] Umar, Bambang Widodo, Polisi vs Politik dalam Konteks Keamanan Pemilu, dalam http://idsps.org/ publikasi-idsps/makalah/aktor-keamanan-dan-pemilu/

[2] TA. Legowo, “Institusi – Institusi Politik dan Keamanan Nasional., CSIS, 2005.

[3] J Kristiadi, “Demokrasi Dan Strategi Keamanan nasional yang Partisipatif “, CSIS, 2006.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Awaludin Jamin, “Kedudukan Kepolisian Negara RI dlam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Dulu , Kini dan Esok”, PTIK Press, 2007.

[6] Inilah.com, “Anggaran Polri Akan Naik Jadi Rp 44 T”, 18 Nov 2008

http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/11/18/62770/anggaran-polri-akan-naik-jadi-rp-44-t/

[7] Prof (Ris) Hermawan Sulistyo, “Paradigma Ilmu dan Paradigma Kerja Polri”, Bahan Kuliah Sespim Polri tangggal 23  Februari 2009.

[8] IDSPS, “Reformasi Kepolisian Indonesia”, Seri 6 Backgrounder, Juni 2008.

[9] Sunarto, Menuju Polisi Sipil yang Profesional, http://www.lampungpost.com/cetak/cetak.php?id=2007070203512668

[10] , “Rizal Ramli , Kami Korban Penguasa”, http://www.kompas.com3 Agustus 2008.

And the Implementation of OECD Convention: Some Legal Issues in Practice

By: Sambodo Purnomo Yogo, SIK, MTCP

Introduction

Recently corruption problem does not belong to the domestic or a state only. The corruption has become international problem since “corruption respects no border, knows no economic distinction and infects all form of government.”[1] In general, corruption is defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit.[2] Basically, there are three forms of corruption; bribery, extortion and nepotism. Those forms of corruption could be done in many variations, such as bureaucratic corruption, political corruption, grand corruption and noble cause corruption.[3]

One of the corruption types that have attracted international attention is the bribery of foreign public official in international business transaction. This is because three reasons. First, usually the briber is a multinational company (MNC) who has power and money, and therefore this corruption is highlighted by the enormous scale of corruption. Secondly, this corruption involved so many high level government officials including President, Prime Minister, Minister, Ambassador and parliament members; hence the disclosure of the corruption case may impact on the political dynamic of the country. Lastly, the foreign bribery may involve more than one jurisdiction, which creating some difficulties in enforcement.

Concerned about the negative impact of foreign bribery, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued the Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction in 1997. The OECD issued this convention mainly because OECD members are home to most of the MNCs and OECD have vested interest to regulate the fair competition among them.[4] Moreover, there was a pressure from the United States (US), because  at the time it was the only country outlawing foreign bribery under Foreign Corruption Practice Act 1977.[5]

Surely the convention represents the expansion of legal measures to combat the bribery of foreign public official[6] and become the impetus of worldwide change in attitude toward corruption in international business transaction.[7] However, some experts argue that this convention has some limitations and problems in the implementation.[8] Some others even argue that this convention is too difficult to implement because bribery in international business transaction is inevitable and it “lubricate the wheel” of daily business.[9]

With regard to this issue, some questions may arise. What is the specific form of bribery to foreign public official? How is it happened ? Why the MNCs bribe the foreign public official? What are the obstacles or the limitations in the implementation of OECD convention? This paper will assess these questions. This paper will analyze the forms of foreign bribery and some cases in bribery of foreign public official in international business transaction. It also discusses some legal issues with regard to the criminalization of foreign bribery in the domestic law of each state party of the convention.

It is argued that practically the bribery to foreign public officials may be formed in bribe, kickback, grease or facilitating payment, extortion and agent fee. The bribery is used by MNCs to influence the provision of the legislation or policies, to secure and maintain the contract, to reduce tax and to have protection from the public official in the host country. Based on the convention, foreign bribery should be criminalized and whoever involved in those corruptions, either individual or corporation should be punished. However, the implementation of this convention may lead to the discussion of some legal issues including the ambiguity of the status of political official, the limitation of state’s jurisdiction, the dispute between criminal or civil matter, the criminal liability of corporation and the unfair treatment between the company who give the bribery and the high-profile corrupt official who received it.

The Definition and the Forms of International Bribery

The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in International Business Transaction 1997, defines the offence of bribery as:

“any Intentional offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”[10]

In practice, however, bribery to foreign public official may take in many forms, such as bribe, kickback, grease or facilitating payment, extortion and agent fees.

Bribe is an inducement that influences a public official to perform his/her duties in a manner contrary to the course that would otherwise be adopted.[11] Since a long time a go, multinational companies (MNCs) have used bribe to improperly influence many kinds of judicial, legislative or administrative acts, to procure or maintain contract or concession, to reduce tax and to obtain product approval.[12] For instance, in 1970, the United Brands paid $1,25 million to a Minister of Economy in Honduras to get  tax reduction in Honduras’s banana export.[13] In 2001, Titan Corp, a San Diego defense contractor, funneled $2 million to Mathieu Kerekou, during his campaign for reelection as president of Benin (a country in West Africa) and gave his wife a $1,850 pair of earring, in order to maintain the contract of telecommunication project.[14] From 1997 to 2002, Monsanto, the giant agrochemical company, authorized and directed an Indonesian consulting firm to make an illegal payment totaling $700,000  to at least 140  senior Indonesian official. This bribe was made to influence the revision of a decree that was likely to have an unfavorable effect on Monsanto’s business in the transgenic cotton.[15]

The other type of foreign bribery is kickback. Kickback is cash or expensive gifts given to foreign officials so a MNC would receive contracts that it would not otherwise have been awarded.[16] An example of the kickback practice is the case of Halliburton, a US company who won $3,4 billion the Iraq reconstruction contract and more than $2,4 billion oil contract. In 2004, The US Congress has reported that Halliburton allegedly gave kickback at least $ 700 million to Iraqi Government and the US military staff in Iraq.[17] Another kickback is the case of Australian Wheat Board (AWB) that allegedly gave kickback AUS $ 300 million to Sadam Husein in order to won the “oil for food” contract.[18]

Another type of this bribery is grease or facilitating payments. It is an inducement that causes a public official to accelerate performance of a legal public function for the benefit of company. For example; A MNC give cash to immigration officials so they will promptly grant legitimate visa request for their expatriate employees. The MNC pays the customs officials so the shipments of its product will not be delayed.[19] These “lubricating” or facilitating payments are typically small sum of money and paid to low-level government officials to perform their duties in such way that they may give benefit for the company.

Extortion or blackmail is the payments given by MNCs to the corrupt official by means of intimidation, threat of violence and abuse of public trust. The extortion payments to public officials are paid to protect the company’s assets, staff or financial from the potential governmental injury, interference or expropriation.[20] For example, it has been reported that the Freeport Company in Papua, Indonesia used to pay $5 – $7 million per year directly to the Indonesian President, Soeharto, and $20.3 million to one of his yayasan (Charity Foundation), in order to have the “president protection” from the threat of Indonesian parliament with regard to the environmental issue and Indonesian military with regard to the security issue.[21] It was also reported that from 1998 to 2004, Freeport paid Indonesian military and police officers nearly $20 million to secure its operations in the Indonesian province of Papua.[22]

The last type of bribery to foreign public official is “agent fee”.[23] Agent fee is commission paid by MNCs to enterprising, lawyers, consultants or commissioners, who are either the Royal families or President’s family or the high level of officials or military general. However, the payment is not related to their professional service but it is related to the “fee” for winning the contract or to “secure” the company. For instance, Boeing Company paid more than $50 million per year in questionable payment for “consultant fee” to a prince, an ambassador, and some officials of foreign government or a person who closely associated with them in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Sudan.[24]

Based on those forms, obviously the “lucky” recipients are the head of states, cabinet, minister, parliament, general, custom officials, immigration official and so on. This condition is consistent with the definition of foreign public official as mentioned in the convention. In the OECD Convention, Foreign Public Official means:

“[a]ny person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organization.”[25]

Based on the definition, the convention excluded the official of political party, because it is not a public official. However, the political system in the country may have made this person become so importance in affecting a regulation or policy. Unsurprisingly, some MNCs bribe the political party in the name of “political contribution” that may not be regarded as a form of foreign public official’s bribery

The Impact of Foreign Bribery

Foreign bribery does have significant impact both to the country and the companies, because of the enormous scale of the bribery and the parties who involved in the bribery process. The huge scale of this corruption is shown in the fact that 5 % of exports to developing counties – worth around $50 to 80 billion per year – goes to corrupt official.[26] It was also reported that bribe was used to influence the outcome of 239 international contract competitions between May 1994 and April 1998, with the total contract worth as $108 billion and the briber usually won the contract.[27] The result MIG’s survey to 7500 MNCs in 1999, showed that MNCs lost more than ₤7,5 billion by bribery, cronyism, and bureaucratic delays.[28]

In political impact, this corruption has made two former presidents in South Korea, to be convicted of bribery and in India several former cabinet members have been indicted as well.[29] The international bribery has led to arrest Prime Minister Tanaka in Japan, and has disgraced Prince Bernhard in Netherlands.[30] In 1999, the entire European Commission, the highest political body in European Union (EU), resigned because they had lost the confidence of politician and public as a result of corruption scandal which involved a MNC, Group 4 Securitas.[31]

In economical impact, some experts argue that this type of corruption will inhibits economic development, and undermines market efficiency and create non-tariff barrier to foreign trade that reduces firm’s competitiveness.[32] Moreover, the global statistic indicate that a huge amount of money are being diverted to foreign officials who are allowing contract to be given to those who pay the most. Hence, the free market competition cannot work efficiently.[33]

The Criminalization of International Bribery

In article 1, the OECD convention explicitly obligates each state party to establish the bribery of foreign public official as a criminal offence under its law. Each state party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence, either if the offence is committed in its territory or the offence is committed abroad but by its national.[34] Moreover, each state party should establish the mutual legal assistance with regard to the offence and it should be included as extraditable offence, even if the extradition process may involve two countries which have no extradition agreement.[35] Through all those provisions, obviously, the convention has become a strong legal basis for the criminalization of the foreign bribery and enforce the global sanctions.

Some OECD members have implemented the convention and criminalized the offence of foreign bribery in its municipal law. The US is the first country which has criminalized such offence since 1977 in its Foreign Corrupt Practice act, known as FCPA (amended in 1988 and 1998). The FCPA criminalized the bribery of foreign public official by US corporations and individual pursuing business in other countries and required that companies meet certain standard regarding their accounting practice, books and records.[36] The criminal offence of foreign bribery will be enforced by Department of Justice, while the violation of accounting practice will be investigated by Security Exchange Commission (SEC).[37] Australia also criminalizes foreign bribery in its “Commonwealth Criminal Code Amendment Act: Bribery of Foreign public Official 1999”. The foreign bribery is criminal offence unless the conduct is lawful in the foreign country and it is a facilitation payment made to secure the performance of a routine government action.[38]

In the enforcement of the foreign bribery, the US has been the most active jurisdiction, bringing 35 cases since 1998 and 17 serious investigations. France has had three foreign bribery cases. Germany has brought only one case, although it has conducted 12 serious investigations. The United Kingdom (UK), however, since the convention came into force in UK law in 2002, there has been no prosecutions for bribing foreign officials overseas.[39]

However, not all the OECD members have the same perception about the convention. For instance, in Belgium and Germany, bribery was effectively tax deductible.[40] Japan and Dutch were reported by OECD Working Group, as the countries that less willingness to investigate and prosecute foreign bribery.[41] OECD also encouraged Denmark to increase the penalties for foreign bribery because the maximum sanction for foreign bribery is lower than for comparable offences in the Danish Penal Code.[42]

Some Legal Issues in the Implementation of OECD Convention

The disparity among the OECD members and the low level of the prosecution over foreign bribery indicate that there are some legal issues that should be considered in the implementation of the convention in domestic law, such as the unfair treatment, the limitation of state’s jurisdiction, the corporate criminal liability, the dispute between parent company and the subsidiaries and the choice between civil or criminal matters.

The “Unfair Treatment”.

Beside the uncertainty of the status of political official, regarding the high profile of corrupt official who receive the bribe, the enforcement of foreign bribery may create the condition of “unfair treatment” between the briber (the MNCs) and the receiver (the foreign public official). Remember that bribery always involves two parties, the briber and the receiver or the recipients, thus, both of them should be punished. In fact, in many cases, only the briber is given the punishment. For instance, in the Tistan Corp case, the company was sent to the court in charge related to violation of the US FCPA and it pleaded guilty and paid $28,5 million.[43] However, Mathieu Kerekou still became the President of Benin until he resigned in April 2006 and no trial court for him.[44]

The bribery to high-profile foreign public official is regarded as “governmental corruption” or “bureaucratic corruption”, and the condition of “unfair treatment” is consistent with the nature of this type of corruption. This corruption involves the buying and selling of power over public policies and “it is more easily protected behind a façade of legality because of the corrupt official’s position and identity.”[45] Hence, the political will of the government in host country is very importance to determine whether the bribery’s receiver will be punished.

Indeed, the criminalization of foreign bribery has been the momentum of the global effort to combat the corruption in transnational context. However, it is arguable that actually the OECD is not really “global”. The OECD member is only 30 countries.[46], a home of almost MNCs in the world. Although  It is reported that OECD members produce  two-thirds of the total world’s goods and service. However, while  Most of the OECD members are developed country, most of the foreign bribery cases were committed in developing country and non-OECD  member such as the countries in Africa and Asia. So, the effort to combat the bribery is only from the side of “briber”, but less from the side of the “receiver”.

The Limitation of the State’s Jurisdiction

Regarding the condition of “unfair treatment”, a question may arise. Why the US Department of Justice can not prosecute the Benin President who receives the bribery from Tistan Corp? This question is crucial in assessing the limitation of the jurisdiction of the states, respecting the transnational context of foreign bribery.

In international law, the power of the state to investigate and to prosecute should be based on “state jurisdiction”. The English word “Jurisdiction” is derived from the Latin ‘juris dictio’, meaning ‘the administration of justice’.[47] State’s jurisdiction means “its authority under international law to regulate the conduct of persons, natural and legal and to regulate property in accordance with its municipal law”.[48]

For the prosecution of crime, the most influential element is the place where the crime has been committed (the territoriality principle). Thus, every state who has the domestic law against foreign bribery can prosecute such offence if it is committed in their territory, regardless the nationality of the offender (active nationality principle), or the seriousness of the bribery (protective principle).[49] In fact, some country such as the US, the UK and Australia now have municipal laws against foreign bribery, with the capability of “extra-territoriality enforcement jurisdiction”, so the state can prosecute the bribery even if it is committed abroad.

Eventually, the enforcement of foreign bribery will lead to conflict jurisdiction between the countries. The states may have extra-territoriality enforcement jurisdiction, but it does have some limitation. First, the offender is its national. Second, it should be consented by the state where the crime is committed, because based on international law, a state may not enforce its criminal law in the territory of another state without consent by the local state.[50] Obviously, this requirement will restrict the capability of the state to seize or confiscate the proceeds of bribery – as articulated in article 3, the OECD Conventions[51] – because usually the assets of the MNCs are significant for the development of the host country.

The Corporate Crime Liability: Corporation or Individual?

In some countries such as the UK and the US, “corporation may be criminally liable although it has done nothing to bring about the offence of an individual”.[52] It is supported by the opinion that corporation is more than an aggregation of individuals. “Corporations are complex entities with their own standards of behaviour that may deviate form a defined norm, so as to warrant being described as criminal.”[53] The criminal liability of the corporation was shown in the case of Tistan Corp and Monsanto Company in the US, whereby both of them must pay a huge amount of fine.

On the other hand, some experts argue that corporation does not have criminal liability.  Criminal act required at least two element: the means rea (the intent to harm) and actor reus (a criminal act to cause harm). In this sense, the corporation does not have neither element of “means rea” (guilty mind) nor independence of actions apart from decision and actions of the human beings involved.[54] The corporation cannot have a will or intent of its own and therefore “not capable of being subject to the highly individualistic principle of criminal law”.[55]

In convicting individual for corporation fault, one that should be examined is the intent of the person. Some individuals within a corporation should have a duty to prevent the offending act, as far as reasonably possible.[56] Therefore, in Australia, for instance, directors and other corporate officers are subject to “direct legal responsibilities” in relation to their own conduct in managing a corporation, and “derivative legal responsibilities” in relation to breaches of corporation.[57]

Hence, based on those two opinion, it is still debatable whether the punishment should be given to the company’s employees who paying the bribery or to the company it self because the bribery is the decision for the sake of company’s interest. It is arguable, if the punishment is merely the responsibility of the company, a director or the employee of the company may bribe the public official without any fear being punish, and therefore, it will undermine the effort to combat foreign bribery.

Parents Company or Subsidiaries?

Another issue is, to whom the punishment should be given, the parents company or the subsidiaries. In discussing this issue, whether or not the parent company should be prosecuted or punished for a bribery that is committed by the subsidiaries, it requires an analysis of both the relationship between parents and subsidiary, and the connection of each to the offence.[58] The critical issue is, whether the decision to give a bribe is taken by the directors in parent company or it just the decision of the subsidiaries. In the US FCPA, for example, the parent corporation is discharged from responsibility of violation by its subsidiary as long as the parent acted in good faith to encourage compliance with FCPA’s accounting control.[59] In Monsanto case, after pleaded guilty, the Monsato parent company in US, paid $1.5 million to resolve charges of bribing Indonesian government officials. Although prosecutors do not allege that Monsanto’s top executives knew about the bribes, they do contend the corruption because of the company’s lack supervision.[60]

For many reasons, actually the parents companies would prefer that any prosecution be restricted to the subsidiary.[61] First, the prosecution will be brought in the host country whose laws, procedure and judges might be favorable for the subsidiary. Second, if the subsidiary is convicted, the punishment will not influence the whole company’s business including other subsidiaries in other countries. Having said this, in practical matter, the decision as to whom it will be charged will be determined by the ability of the state to assert its jurisdiction over the parents company.[62]

Civil or Criminal matters?

As mentioned above, the OECD convention and some such legislations in UK, US and Australia recognize the foreign bribery as a criminal offence. However, there is a common perception that corporate crimes are not truly criminal and therefore more appropriately to be dealt with in the civil courts.[63] This notion is supported by “the establishment of specialist agency to regulate and ensure compliance so the impression being that such offence are not true crime as they are dealt with regulatory bodies, rather than the police”.[64] Moreover, for the company, civil proceeding is better than criminal proceeding because the label “criminal” carriers with it a social stigma.[65] However, the stigma will influence the company’s image and the perception of the customer and the shareholder.

Hand in hand with the regulatory model is the creation of civil penalties to substitutes the criminal punishment. For example, the requirement to meet the certain standard in accounting in the US FCPA, which is investigated by SEC, is the form of civil matter rather than criminal matters. The UK’s Proceeds of Crime act 2002 have created a new civil right which enable state to sue in the High Court for the recovery of the property  which has been obtained trough a crime.[66] Currently, the

Conclusion

This paper has shown that bribery of foreign public official in international business transaction have created some negative impact both in politic, social and economy. However, since a long time ago, the MNCs have used bribery, either if the form of bribe, kickback, grease, extortion and agent fee, to “lubricate” their business such as, to have protection from public official, to improperly influence many kinds of judicial, legislative or administrative acts, to procure or maintain contract or concession, to reduce tax and to obtain product approval.

The negative effect of foreign bribery has made the OECD issued the Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Official in 1977. This convention obligates each state party to criminalize foreign bribery in its municipal law. Nonetheless, some legal issues appear with regard to the implementation of the OECD convention, such as unfair treatment, the limitation of state’s jurisdiction, the corporate criminal liability, the dispute between parent company and the subsidiaries and the choice between civil or criminal matters.

To deal with those problems, the paper offers some recommendation. First, in host country, the discretionary authority of state official should be reduced to eliminate their opportunities to extract bribes. [67] This effort could be done by the establishment of clearly regulation and standard operational procedure (SOP) and the decentralization of authority. Second, the competition to win the contract should be supervised by the independence body. It could be international body created by the OECD or the domestic body supervised by the OECD. Third, the convention against foreign bribery will not resolve the problem if it only bind the OECD member. It should be a “really global” effort under the international convention, created by the United Nations. Fourth, in the bribery case, both the company and the employee who involved in bribery should be punished. The company should pay fine, while the employee should put on jail. Lastly, the enforcement of foreign bribery should be multifaceted, civil and criminal proceeding together. For example, while the company is charged to pay the fine in criminal court, the asset can be seized by using the procedure of civil forfeiture.

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[1] Enery Quinones, “What is Corruption” ( April 2000), 220, The OECD Observer, 23.

[2] Selcuk Akcay, “Corruption and Human Development” (2006), 26, Cato Journal, 29.

[3] John McFarlane, “Corruption and the Financial Sector: The Strategic Impact” (2001), 9, 1, Journal of  Financial Crime, 8.

[4] David gantz, “Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery” (1998), 18, 2, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 483.

[5] George, Lacey and Birmele, above n 5, Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen Lacey and Jutta Birmele, “The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitude toward Corruption in Business Transactions” (2000), 37, 3, American Business Law Journal, 494.

[6] Jon Moran, “Bribery and Corruption: the OECD Convention on Comabting the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction” (1999), 8, 3, Business Ethics: A European Review, 141.

[7] George, Lacey and Birmele, above n 5, 485.

[8] Moran, above n 6, 144.

[9] Laurence Cockroft, “Transnational Bribery: Is it Inevitable?” (1996), 7, 3, Business Strategy Review, 30.

[10] Article 1, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in International Business Transaction. Signed 17 December 1977, Entry Into Force 15 February 1999.

[11] Wayne Hamra, “Bribery in International Business Transactions and the OECD Conventions: Benefits and Limitation” (2000), 35, 4, Business Economics, 33.

[12] Thomas Gladwin and Ingo Walter, “Multinationals Under Fire: Lesson in the Management of Conflict” (1980), 299

[13] Ibid.

[14] Renae Marle, “Titan Admits Bribery in Africa”, Washington Post, 2 March 2005. Page E01.

[15] Third World Network. “Monsanto Bribery Charge in Indonesia”,    http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2005/Monsanto-Indonesia-Bribery27jan05.htm, at 6 September 2006.

[16] Hamra, above n 11, 34.

[17] Congress of the United States, “New Information about Halliburton Contracts”, Memorandum 10 March 2004, page 5.

[18] Belinda Tasker, “PR Expert Warned AWB Execs about Sadam” (22 August 2006), News.com.au http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,20218817-37435,00.html, at 6 September 2006.

[19] Hamra, above n 11, 34.

[20] Gladwin and Walterr, above n 12, 300.

[21] Denise Leith, “Freeport and the Suharto Regime, 1965-1998” (2002), 14, 1, The Contemporary Pacific, 87.

[22] Katharine Q. Seelye, “INDONESIA: Mining Company Notes U.S. Review of Payments to Indonesian Military”, Corpwatch, January 19th, 2006 http://www.warprofiteers.com/article.php?id=13145, at 8 September 2006.

[23] Gladwin and Walter, above n 12, 300.

[24] Jery Landauer, “US Says Some Boeing Consultants are Officials of Foreign Government” (1977), The Wall Street Journal, cited in Gladwin and Walter, ibid, 301.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Nicholas Mos, “Who Bribes Wins” (11 December 1997), The European, 26.

[27] George,  Lacey and Birmele,  above n  5, 492.

[28] Maitland Alison, “Emerging Market Pose Hidden Risk” (11 Maret 1999), Financial Times, 5.

[29] Hamra,  above n 11, 33

[30] Gladwin and Walter,  above n 12, 297.

[31] David Hall, “Privatisation, Multinationals and Corruption” (1999), 9, 5, Development in Practice, 544.

[32] Hamra, above n 11, 33.

[33] George, Lacey and Birmele, above n 5, 494.

[34] Article 4, Jurisdiction. Text of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public official in International Business Transaction, Open for signature 17 December 1997 , Entry into force 15 February 1999

[35] article 9 and 10 The OECD Convetion, Ibid.

[36] Oren Gleich and Ryan Woodward, “Foreign Corrupt Prctice Act” (2005), 42, American Criminal Law Review, 545.

[37] Ibid, 547.

[38] Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association,  “Austalian Law Prohibit Foreign Bribery” (2000),1 See Bribery of Foreign Public Officals; Australia Guidelines, www.tisn.gov.au at 8 September 2006.

[39] Reena Sengupta, “Troubles at Home for Overseas Bribes” (2 february 2006), Financial Times, 12.

[40] Moran, above n 6, 142.

[41] OECD, “OECD Says Japan Needs To Be Proactive In Foreign Bribery Cases”, 29 June 2006

http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,2340,en_2649_37447_37020515_1_1_1_37447,00.html,

at 7 September 2006.

[42] OECD, “OECD Recommends Denmark to Toughen Sanctions for Foreign Bribery Offences”,

26 June 2006,      http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,2340,en_2649_37447_37001422_1_1_1_37447,00.html,

at 7 September 2006.

[43] Marle, above n 14.

[44]IRIN Africa, “BENIN: President Mathieu Kerekou Leaves after 29 Years“ (7 April 2006)

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=52665&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=BENIN, at  8 September 2006.

[45] Dwight Y King, “Corruption in Indonesia; A Curable Cancer?” (2000), 53, 2, Journal of International Afairs, 605.

[46] Twenty countries originally signed the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on 14 December 1960. Since then a further ten countries have become members of the Organisation. The Member countries of the OECD are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

See OECD official website http://www.oecd.org.

[47] Ivan Shearer, ‘Jurisdiction’, in  Sam Blays, Ryszard Piotrowicz and B Martin Tsamenyi (eds), Public International Law; An Australian perspective (1998), 161.

[48] There are two kinds of jurisdictions; jurisdiction to prescribe (prescriptive jurisdiction) and jurisdiction to enforce (enforcement jurisdiction). Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a state’s authority to criminalize such conduct by its legislation. Enforcement jurisdiction refers to a state’s authority to apply its criminal law, ‘through police and other executive actions and through the court’.

See Roger O ‘Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concepts’ (2004), 2, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 736.

[49] Tom Vander Beken, “The Best place for Prosecution of International Corruption Cases”, Paper in the Third Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and safeguarding Integrity, Seoul, 29 May 2003, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy.

[50] Shearer, above n 47, 161

[51] Article 3, The OECD Convention: Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable.

[52] James Gobert and Maurice Punch, “Rethinking Corporate Crime” (2003), 59.

[53] Jonthan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, “The Prosecution of Corporations” (2002), 5.

[54] Michael Gilbert and Steve Russel, “Globalization of Criminal Justice in the Corporate Context “ (2002), 38, 3, Crime. Law and Social Change, 217.

[55] Clough and Mulhern, above n 53, 5.

[56] Australian Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, “Personal Liability for Corporate Fault” (2005), 9-14.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Gobert and Punch, above n 52, 150.

[59] Oren Gleich and Ryan Woodward, “Foreign Corrupt Prctice Act” (2005), 42, American Criminal Law Review, 545.

[60] Peter Fritsch and Timothy Mapes, “Seed Money: In Indonesia, a Tangle of Bribes Creates Trouble for Monsanto, (5 April 2005), Wall Street Journal.

[61] Gobert and Punch, above n 52, 150

[62] Ibid.

[63]Clough and Mulhern, above n 53, 10.

[64] Ibid, 11.

[65] Anthony Kennedy, “Justifying the Civil recovery of Criminal Proceeds” (2004), 12, 1, Journal of Financial Crime, 8.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann, “Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies” (2001), 38, 3, Finance and Development, 31.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF  THE “NEW TERRORISM” FOR

THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE

By: Kompol. Sambodo Purnomo Yogo, SIK, MTCP.

Introduction

Just one week after 9/11 attack, The United States (US) National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice told the press that:

‘This is not Pearl Harbor. No, it was worse. Sixty years ago, US did not have a director of central intelligence or 13 intelligence agencies or a combined intelligence budget of more than $30 billions to provides early warning of enemy attack……there was no genuine intelligence community on the eve of September 11, 2001’.[1]

Although some observers argue that the 9/11 attack was not merely the failure of intelligence but also the failure of politic,[2] the finger is always pointed to intelligence community (IC). The Rice’s comment underscored the premise that intelligence is always blamed in the case of undetected terrorist attack. However, the war on terror still continues without ending story. So, intelligence will always be needed, but just how the IC should organize and manage is a more difficult part.[3]

Since the end of cold war, the 9/11 attack of WTC and pentagon in 2001, and followed by terrorist attacks in some mayor city in the world including Jakarta, Bali, Madrid, London and so forth, the world realized that they were facing the new wave of terrorism. The characteristics of “new terrorism” and the failure of intelligence to prevent their attacks may implicate the conduct of intelligence.

This essay examines the implications of new terrorism to conduct of intelligence. It is argued that the intelligence should be reformed to avoid the same failures and to build the capabilities of intelligence to deal with the new terrorism. The reformations of intelligence should be done in structures, legislations, operations and cultures. In this essay, the reformation of intelligence in the United States (US) and Australia will be used as the examples of the implication of new terrorism for the conduct of intelligence.

Characteristic of New Terrorism

The phrase “new terrorism” refers to some things that make it different with the previous “old terrorism”. Many literatures and experts have analysed this issue from different perspective. However, most of them end up with the same conclusions about the characteristics of new terrorism.  Those characteristic are explained bellow.

Religious Terrorism

The US National Commission on Terrorism (NCT) found fanaticism of religious rather than political interest is more often the motivation of terrorism now.[4] Morgan claims that ‘[T]errorists today are ultimately more apocalyptic in their perspective and methods’.[5] Kometer, categorized PLO, IRA and Red Army as “old terrorists”, because their aims are political change and freedom while Al-Qaeda network and Aum Shinrikyo is categorized as “new terrorists” because their aims are based on religious believe.[6] The increasing religious terrorism is underpinned by the increasing of suicide bombing. This suicide is part of believe in religion, such as, “jihad” in Islam.[7]

It is inline with the 9/11 Commission’s claim that Osama bin Laden with his Al-Qaeda network is the prime examples of the emerging of new terrorism.[8] Al-Qaeda’s primary target is US and its allies.[9] This because, in Al-Qaeda’s point of view, the US foreign policies have created suffer and humiliated Moslems around the world. To amplify his fight against US, Laden issued fatwa ;

‘[T]he ruling to kill the Americans and their Allies-civilian and military is an individual duty for every Moslems who can do it in any country in which its possible to do it”.[10]

Erosion of Traditional Structure

The new terrorist structure is less clearly identifiable ‘chains of hierarchy and command’.[11] There is no unitary or clearly defined leadership or central head quarter. Today, the terrorist organizations are globally networked and they work in small cell. Although the members do communicate with the leader, they are independence to determine the target and ‘operate self-sufficiently’.[12] For example, Al-Qaeda network is described as a loose network of some militant Islamic terrorist organizations such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS and Hizb’Allah. Those organizations have their own targets. However, Al-Qaeda was probably just a financial supporter and ideological umbrella, called as The World Islamic Front.[13]

They continue to enjoy the benefits of indirect state sponsorships. For example, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Afghanistan are still in the US’s list of terrorist sponsor states.[14] However, by the end of cold-war, the Russian and countries in Pact Warsaw are not longer defined as state sponsors for the potential terrorist attack upon US and its allies.[15] Furthermore, Spencer argues that the new terrorism is not merely financed by state sponsor, but also from illegal activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping and robbery; as well as legal business and donation.[16]

Less Discrimination on Target

The new terrorism is said to be much less discriminating in target. It is more likely to target civilians and has an ability to strike from remote distance.[17] The attacks of new terrorism are much greater lethality, pose a greater threat to more diverse selection of targets and less consider to any moral or humanitarian limits.[18] Through the analysis of data on international terrorism, Spencer argues that although the number of terrorist attack generally declined in the mid of 1980s, the number of fatalities per incident has increased since 1980s.[19]

Technological  Terrorist.

The new terrorists are said to have more access to weapons of mass destructive (WMD) and technologies rather than the old terrorist.[20] The main WMD is called as CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state user is the significant factor for the danger of nuclear terrorism.[21] Chemical and Biological weapons may offer some advantages for terrorist attack. They may produce high casualties, extremely dangerous, invisible and sometimes odorless, reducing the detection while attack is operated.[22] Furthermore, the development of technology may give chance for various technological attacks other than CBRN. For example O’Brien warned the possibility of cyber-terrorism that use global information network to send viruses, hijack and intercept the data and break down the computer systems.[23]

The Failure of Intelligence in 9/11 Attack

Although it is difficult to say when did the new terrorism exactly started (some experts point out the mid of 1990s), the 9/11 attack is the starting point of the development of national security systems in many countries, particularly in intelligence. This because the revelation of some intelligence failures that make US intelligence unable to get information which provide timing, type and target as requirement for actionable intelligence.[24]

The US joint House-Senate Committee for investigation of the 9/11 attack argued that some serious problems in information sharing between Intelligence Communities (IC) and non IC agencies were occurred prior to the attack.[25] For example, the airline companies had never known the list of intelligence’s suspected person. Therefore, two terrorists of the 9/11 attack ( Nawaf al_Hazmi and Kahalid Al-Mihdar) could purchase airline tickets under their true name, although they have listed on CIA published watch-list of potential terrorist, who should not be allowed enter the country[26] and CIA had known that they had met Yazi Sufaat, an Al-Qaeda member in Malaysia.[27]

The information sharing problems were also happened among IC, such as between FBI and CIA. While CIA only disseminated the information about Nawaf and Khalid within the CIA communities, in turn, FBI did not notify CIA that they had taken flight training in US in May 2000. This lacking communications may result in a lost opportunity to arrest them prior 9/11 attack.[28] Furthermore, while CIA had received many information about the possibility of Al-Qaeda attacks within US territory (such as the information from Royal Jordanian Intelligence Service)[29], the leader of FBI’s counter terrorism declared that he was ‘98% certain that Bin laden would like strike overseas’.[30] FBI even repeatedly assured the US government that Al-Qaeda unable to launch a domestic strike.[31]

Intelligence does not have legal authorites as like as law enforcement agency. The information of intelligence is not admissible to be the evidences in legal systems. Once FBI was aware of Zacarias Moussaoui’s plan to hijack a plane, FBI just could send him the US Immigration and Naturalization Service in charge of visa violation, because at the time, no crime had been committed. Prior his detention, FBI requested for search warrant for his computer. However, the request was refused because there is no evidence that support a “probable cause” to justify it.[32] Given a comment to the law barrier in intelligence, a senior FBI agent claims that suppose FBI have information about some foreign students were taking flying training but they uninterested to learn how to take off and landing, the FBI can not do anything because no crime had yet been committed and taking flying training is not a crime.[33]

The IC was overwhelming in collecting, selecting and analyse and dissemination of information. This conditions may result intelligence lose very crucial information to prevent the attack. For instance, on 10 September 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a telephone conversation between Al-Qaeda members in US. One on the telephone declared “the match begins tomorrow”, and another said “tomorrow is zero day”. However, analyst dismissed the intercept, because it did not specifically mention the target. While the director of NSA was questioned before a joint committee of senate and intelligence, he claimed that

‘NSA analysts were confronted with huge volume of intercepts each day and needed to sift material quickly, translate it from Arabic to English and discard some information so that other information could be selected for scrutiny….it was nearly impossible because NSA receive more than two million information per hour from all over the world’

All those facts mention some examples of the failure intelligence prior 9/11 attack. However, the weaknesses of intelligence are not only happened in US but also in every country. Since the 9/11 attack, many countries have revised its intelligence organization, in order to improve the capability of intelligence to deal with new terrorism.

Implications to Conduct of Intelligence

The characteristic of new terrorism and the failure of intelligence to deal with such terrorism may have implications to the conduct of intelligence. The Intelligence should be reformed in organization structures, legislations, operations and culture.

The Structures of Intelligence Organisation (IO).

The structure of IO should be changed from the formal, hierarchical and compartmentalized information to horizontal, cooperative, fluid and flexible architecture that support information sharing system among Intelligence agencies.[34] The 9/11 Commission recommended the establishment of some new structures in IO such as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and National Counterterrorism Centre.[35] It recommended also the unity of effort between foreign and domestic intelligence and all US IC such as NSA, NGA (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and so fort.[36] The goal of US restructuring intelligence is to ensure that US government can have ‘the best possible information to make the best possible decision’.[37]

Follows the recommendations, President Bush in December 2004 signed The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) which created the position of DNI. When he signed the act, President Bush stated that the DNI will lead a unified IC and will serve as the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters. The DNI has three deputies; foreign Intelligence (CIA director), defense Intelligence (under Secretary of DIA), and homeland intelligence (FBI or under Secretary of Homeland Security). [38] DNI will have authority to ensure the sharing of information among agencies, to establish an IC’s personnel standard and to determine the annual budget for all national intelligence agency and offices.[39]

In Australia, a new terrorism coordination mechanism, known as National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) was established to coordinate policy between states and territories. The main role of NCTC is:

‘[T]o provide strategic policy advice to heads of government and relevant ministers, to coordinate an effective nationwide counter-terrorism capability and to maintain effective arrangement for sharing relevant intelligence and information between agencies and jurisdiction’.[40]

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was pointed as the host of National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC). NTAC is a fusion of some Australian Intelligence Community (AIC), including ASIO, Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Defense Intelligence Organisation (DIO), DFAT, Office of national Assessment (ONA) and department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS). [41]

The Legislations of Intelligence

Since 9/11 attack, many countries have had same perception that the existing legal framework is not adequate to counter the new terrorism. The new legislation or at least the amendment of regulation is needed as a legal basis for intelligence operation and the establishment of new structure of intelligence organisation. The new legislations will improve the capabilities of intelligence and provide more power for intelligence agencies to counter the new terrorism.

In legislations, unsurprisingly US reacted rapidly to 9/11 attack. At 26 October 2001, US issued Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, known as PATRIOT act. The PATRIOT Act provide greater power to law enforcement and intelligence agencies in communication interceptions, strengthens anti-money laundering laws, immigration laws, create new federal crimes and institutes some procedural changes.[42] In the absence of probable cause in suspecting terrorist, US issued Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and its Court (FISC), whereby under PATRIOT Act, FISC could approve wiretapping and search warrant with regard to the national security.[43]

Other Acts that give greater power to US intelligence are Homeland Security Act (HSA) and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). In 2002, US issued the HSA for establishing the new Department of Homeland Security. The department’s primary missions are preventing terrorist attack within US territory, reducing the vulnerability of US to terrorism at home and minimizing the damage and assisting the recovery from any attacks that may occur.[44] In December 2004, US issued IRTPA. IRTPA will increase the FBI’s ability to targeted terrorist. For example, it allows FBI to obtain wire taps and conduct secret searches on individual terrorist suspect.[45]

In Australia, some new legislation was introduced on March 2002, including The Australian Security Intelligence Organization Amendment Act. This Act provides ASIO with the ability to detain and question people under warrant for up to 48 hours in the first instance in order to gather information about terrorist attack.[46] Another new legislation is Telecommunication Interception Legislation Amendment Act. This amendment gives the right to law enforcement agency and intelligence to intercept telecommunications services on the basis of telecommunication equipments and access to stored communications held by a telecommunications carrier.[47]

The Operations of Intelligence

Intelligence always concerns about the target and the need of customer. Target is the focus of the problem which the customers want answer.[48] In dealing with new terrorism, the target of intelligence should be changed. During cold war, intelligence follows traditional pattern in targeting a state, particularly between US and NATO in one hand and Uni Soviet and Pact Warsaw in other hand. Now, the targets are more likely the failed states and the non state organisations; such as, the potential group of terrorist, the militant Islam and its supporter; such as drugs syndicate and mafia.[49] Therefore, the words “you don’t chase a thief into the mosque” that is usually used in an intelligence training should be revised, because now probably many”thieves” (read: terrorist) now study and hide in Mosque.[50]

The customer of intelligence would also be changed. Now, the customer of intelligence is much wider. It is not only the politic and military official but also foreign partners and private companies.[51] Intelligence of the state should ‘breakout from the old “club” and ‘need to share information with much broader countries’.[52] For example, during the meeting at 20-21 December 2001, Blair and Putin announced a British-Russian Agreement to set up a new joint group to share intelligence. However, during the cold war they were spying to each other.[53]

The intelligence cycle, as a procedure in intelligence operation should also be revised. The traditional intelligence cycle can not provide information in real time for the customer. Even many intelligence officers confess that intelligence process “really does not work like that”.[54] Now the cycle is to make all stakeholders (collectors, analyst and customer) as part of the whole process. This is described by US IC as a ‘network centric collaboration process.[55] The FBI has formalized and simplified the intelligence cycle to new form. That is; first, “knowing what you don’t know”; second, “asking for what you don’t know”; third, “answering the question”, and forth, “ensuring the answer get to the right people”.[56]

Lastly, intelligence operation to deal with new terrorism should be supported by human and money resources. Human intelligence (humint) is always important. Dupont even argued that ‘humint are still crucial to intelligence-gathering notwithstanding the impressive advance in technical collection by unmanned system’.[57] The humint development is not necessarily the increasing of total number of personnel but the important thing is the quality improvement and their allocation to support counterterrorism. In 2004, FBI has allocated 36% of its agent in three priorities; counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime; up from 25% in 2002. In 2003, from 1,156 analysts in FBI, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analyst. However, before 9/11, the FBI employed 159 in counterterrorism analysts.[58] Another important humint development is the improvement of language skill. Whit regard to characteristic of new terrorism, the ability of Arabic language may give much benefit for intelligence operation.

The challenge of new terrorism implicates also to intelligence budget. For example, Australian government committed to give additional funding to domestic security $3,081 million, including $872 million for strengthening intelligence capabilities.[59] In addition, Australian government also provide $48,6 million to establish NTAC.

The Intelligence Culture

The old fashion intelligence culture is secrecy. Intelligence is something that mysterious and none know how the intelligence works. This culture is designed to protect information and not to share it. However, now, it is out of date.[60] The threat of new terrorism needs to share information. The information sharing is not merely among IC within the state, but also among the states. This is because the terrorist attack could endanger the state interest abroad. For example, Bali bombing I in 2002 (88 death victims are Australian) and the attack of Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004. Therefore in February 2002 Indonesia and Australia made arrangement in counterterrorism. Australia also helped Philippine Police to investigate a series of terrorist bombing in 2003.[61]

The information sharing should also be established among the IC within the state. Now, it is not necessary to separated foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence, or between security intelligence and defence intelligence. Indeed, they have their own specification, but, in dealing with terrorism, they should collaborate. The establishment of DNI and NCTC in US and NTAC in Australia is the example of information sharing among IC.

With regard to characteristic of new terrorism, information should also be shared to non IC, both public sector such as hospital, electricity, public transportation, water companies and private sector whose vulnerable target for terrorist attack such as industries and  properties.[62] For example, in Australia ASIO provide Office of Transport Security (OTS) with ‘mayor transport sector threat assessment and risk management of the potentially most significant terrorist attack’.[63] In addition The National Counterterrorism Plan has created four levels counterterrorism alert. Those are LOW for no information to suggest a terrorist attack in Australia, MEDIUM for medium risk of attack, HIGH for high risk of attack and EXTREME for signal that a terrorist attack has occurred.[64]

Today, The IC should provide the open source information (OSI) so the information can be used by general public and media.[65] The old culture in relation between policy-maker and intelligence should be revised as well. Now, the analysis of intelligence should be used as the main consideration in determining a government policy. ‘In an open source environment, intelligence has become one of a number of competing information sources available to policy makers’.[66] By the closer relationship between policy maker and intelligence, they able to prepare for terrorist attack from warning to action, from “low” to “extreme” in very short time.

Another issue in Intelligence culture is the merging of law enforcement agencies and intelligence. Some experts argue that law enforcement and intelligence are very different world.[67] Intelligence is oriented toward future and policy whereas law enforcement is oriented toward response.[68] However, now the gap between them is very slightly. Now, law enforcement agencies should have capabilities in counterterrorism and otherwise intelligence agency should have the right to enforce the law. The sharp distinction between intelligence and law enforcement may result some problems in counterterrorism. For example, before 9/11 attack, FBI never developed a truly coordinated and systematic domestic counterterrorism intelligence capability, because FBI is stressed on its own traditional business; criminal cases.[69] In Australia, AFP and ASIO had problems in evidentiary of terrorism cases.[70] Therefore, the culture of law enforcement and intelligence agencies should be changed. They should have capabilities and authorities to help each other and breaking the barrier between them.

Conclusion

Many lethal terrorist attacks after the cold war which are different with the previous one, have made the world to realise that they were facing a new wave of terrorism. There are some characteristic of new terrorism, such as religious aims, loose structure, less discriminate in target and more technical than the old terrorist. Moreover, some intelligence failures have revealed after the investigation of 9/11 attack. Those two factors (the characteristic of new terrorism and the failure of intelligence to detect 9/11 attack) have implications to conduct of intelligence. The conduct of intelligence should be reformed to deal with the new terrorism. The reformation of intelligence should be established in structure, legislation, operation and culture of Intelligence.

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at 10 may 2006.

[1] Melvin A, Goodman, ‘9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence’ (2003), 18, 4 Intelligence and National Security, 59.

[2] David Leventhal, ‘Bush’s Groupthink Caused failure of Imagination’, People’s Weekly World (2004)

http://www.pww.org/article/articleprint/5767/, at 8 May 2006.

[3] Stan A Taylor and David Goldman, ‘Intelligence Reform: Will More Agencies, Money and Personnel Help? (2004), 19,3, Intelligence and national Security, 418.

[4] Matthew J. Morgan, ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’ (2004), 30.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Michael W Kometer, ‘The New terrorism: The Nature of The war on Terrorism’, The Faculty of The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, (2004), 27-40.

[7] Ibid, 53.

[8] The 9/11 Commission Report (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the United States, 47-65.

[9] Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Alqaeda Threat and the International Response, in David Martin Jones (ed), Globalisation and the New Terror (2004), 51.

[10] Kometer above n 6, 56.

[11] Jonny Burnett and David Whyte, ‘Embedded Expertise and The New Terrorism’ (2003), 1, 4, Journal for Crime, Conflict and The Media, 4.

[12] Alexander Spencer, ‘Questioning the Concept of New terrorism, (2006), 8, Peace Conflict and   Development, 12.

[13] Kometer, above n 6, 57.

[14] Morgan, above n 4, 37.

[15] Kometer, above n 6,  57.

[16] Spencer, above n 12, 11.

[17] Burnet and Whyte, above n 11, 5.

[18] Ibid, 5.

[19] Spencer, above n 12, 16.

[20] Burnet and Whyte, above n 11, 4.

[21] Morgan, above n 4, 39.

[22] Givin Cameron, ‘The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat-Exaggeration or Apocalypse Soon?’ in David Martin Jones (ed), Globalisation and the New Terror (2004), 89-90.

[23] Kevin A, O’Brien, ‘Information Age Terrorism and Warfare, in David Martin Jones (ed), Globalisation and the New Terror (2004), 147.

[24] Kevin Michael Derksen, ‘Commentary: The Logistic of Actionable Intelligence Leading to 9/11’ (2005), 28, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 255.

[25] The Brooking Institute, ‘Building Intelligence to Fight Terrorism’, (2003), 125, Policy Brief, 2.

[26] Stan A. Taylor and David Goldman, ‘Intelligence reform: Will More Agencies, Money and Personnel Help?’ (2004), 19,3, Intelligence and national Security, 419.

[27] Kevin Michael Derksen, ‘Commentary: The Logistic of Actionable Intelligence Leading to 9/11,’ (2004), 28, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 260.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid, 253.

[30] Ibid, 255.

[31] Goodman, above n 1, 62.

[32] Gregory F Treverton(a), ‘Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lesson’ (2003), 18, 4, Intelligence and National Security, 128.

[33] Ibid, 129.

[34] The Brooking Institution, ‘Building Intelligence to Fight Terrorism’ (2003), 125,  Policy Brief, 1.

[35] Gregory F, Treverton (b), ‘The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence’(2005), RAND Corporation, 3.

[36] The 9/11 Commission Report (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the   United States, Chapter 13, 399-419..

[37] The White House, ‘President Signs Intelligence reform and Terrorism Prevention Act’ (2004),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/print/20041217-1.html. at 10 may 2006.

[38] Treverton (b), above n 35, 6.

[39] The White House, ‘President Signs Intelligence reform and Terrorism Prevention Act’ (2004),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/print/20041217-1.html. at 10 may 2006.

[40] Australia’s national Counter-terrorism Policy and Arrangements, ‘Protecting Australia Against Terrorism’ (2004), 10.

[41] Sandy Gordon (a), Re-Shaping Australian Intelligence’ (2005), 1,1 Security Challenges, 14.

[42] Mark Weeding, ‘Post September 11 Legislative Responses to Terrorism’, in David Martin Jones (ed), Globalisation and the New Terror (2004), 270.

[43] Treverton (a), above n 32, 132.

[44] The White House, ‘Analysis For The Homeland Security Act Of 2002’ (2002)

http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/, at 12 May 2006.

[45] Michael Jacobson, ‘The Intelligence reform and Terrorism prevention act: Addressing Controversies, Expanding Powers’ (2004), 929, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Policy Watch, 1.

[46] Wedding, above n 43, 278.

[47] Australian Attorney General, ‘Enhanced Interception Power and Privacy Protection’ (2006)  http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/ministerruddockhome.nsf/page/media_releases_2006_first_quarter_30_march_2006_-_enhanced_interception_powers_and_privacy_protections, at 12 May 2006.

[48] Rober M Clark, ‘Intelligence Analysis: A Target centric Approach’ (2004), 14.

[49] Michael Herman, ‘Ethic and Intelligence After September 2001’ in Understanding Intelligencein Twenty First Century (2004), 180.

[50] Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, ‘Intelligence, Police, Counterterrorism: Assessing Post 9/11 Initiative’ (2003), 5.

[51] Treverton (b), above n 36, 18.

[52] Sandy Gordon (b), ‘Changing Role of Intelligence in the Modern Security Environment’, Lecturer Sources in Centre of Transnational Criminal Prevention, University of Wollongong (2006).

[53] Herman, above n 49, 186.

[54] Clark, above n 48, 15.

[55] Ibid, 18.

[56] Alfred Cumming and Tod Masse, ‘FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11 2001: Issues and Options for Congress’ (2004), CRS Report for Congress, 7.

[57] Alan Dupont, ‘Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century’ (2003), 18, 4, Intelligence and National Security, 21.

[58] Cumming and Masse, above n 57, 12.

[59] Australia’s National Counter-terrorism Policy and Arrangements, ‘Protecting Australia Against Terrorism’ (2004), 7.

[60] Treverton (b), above n 36, vii.

[61] Australian Government, ‘Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia’ (2004), 88.

[62] Jim Nockles, ‘Securing Critical Infrastructure against Terrorism, (2006), 2.

[63] Gordon (a), above n 41, 14.

[64] Australian Government, above n 59, 28.

[65] Gordon (a), above n 41, 17.

[66] Ibid, 18.

[67] Treverton (a), above n 32, 122.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Chalk and Rossenau,  above n 50, 5.

[70] Gordon (a), above n 41, 15.

By: Sambodo Purnomo Yogo, SIK, MTCP

Introduction

There is no crime without victim. Even in case of drugs abuse, the abuser itself could be as offender but in the same time he/she is presumably as a victim. So, it should be addressed that victim is one element of crime. Crime will be investigated, prosecuted and put on trial in a criminal justice system. There are two criminal justice systems which commonly used by most countries in the world. These are common law system or adversarial system and civil law system or inquisitorial system. In this essay, the representation of victims in criminal justice systems will be analyzed in investigation and trial court phase in both common law and civil law systems. Trough analysing of the role of victim in investigation and trial court, it is argued that in common law systems, in certain parts of investigation, victims should not be represented, but during the trial, victims should be entitled to representation. On the other hand, in civil law system, as well as common law system, in certain part of investigation, the victims should not be represented, but the victims may be represented by another party at trial court.

Who is victim ?

There are some definitions of victims, but the most comprehensive understanding is written in the Seventh United Nation Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the treatment of offenders (Milan, 1985)[1]

‘Victims means person who, individually or collectively have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within member states, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power……the term victims also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of direct victims and persons who have suffered harm  in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimizations’

Although the definition of victims is obvious, in some cases, victims are not easily identified. In some cases, such as drug abuse and prostitution, the victims seem abstract.[2] While the broader acknowledge about victims must be understood, victims in this essay refer to “direct victim” that is the one who is directly suffer as a result of crimes.

Common law and civil law systems.

Generally speaking, common law or adversarial law systems is developed over English language speaking countries, known as commonwealth countries. Common law system or adversarial system is often understood as the fight between prosecutor and defence which determine the fate of offender.[3] The investigation will be done by police, but the record of investigation will not be submitted to the court. Only the oral statement of witnesses which are obtained during the investigation will.[4] The role of judge is passive and might be perform as an umpire[5], while prosecutor and defence take an active role to persuade juries in such way so that the juries will decide whether the accused is guilty or not. Thus, for common law systems, the trial court is the most essential stage.[6] Mckillop (2003) claimed that within this system ‘the truth in relation to criminal events may or may not be revealed is not the object of the process’. [7]

Civil law or inquisitorial systems is developed in continental Europe and the countries of South and Central America.[8] Investigation is done by police or investigating judge and the record of investigation will be written in a dossier completely. This dossier will be used as a base or framework of trial court process. While the reveal of the truth is not the object of adversarial systems, in inquisitorial or civil law systems, it is the main object of the process. [9]

By the development and adoption of law, there are no countries which are purely used only one systems of law. For instance Spain and Philippines, they mix and adjust civil law and common law systems.[10] In the United States, the English common law is mixed with American codification and influenced by Spanish and French Civil Codes.[11]

Victim’s role in common law systems.

In common law system, victim’s role in criminal justice systems is very limited. The concept of criminal justice; “state versus offender” , make the role of victims even worst. Some scholars argue that in adversarial system the role of victims in criminal justice system is “passive” because the victims do not have official access to the criminal justice proceeding in their case.[12] Hence, the interest of victim is not addressed sufficiently either in investigation or at trial.

In investigation, victim will be treated as usual witness.[13] The police will collect the statements of the victim and combine with other evidence supports. As police role in investigation, police have responsibility to fulfill two part; firstly police are required to convict the person who responsible for the crime and secondly police have to prove the case against him/her.[14] These responsibilities require police to open and respect to all available sources of information. Information from the victims will guide police/investigator to find evidences and suspects. Moreover, in order to collect evidences and to prove the identity of suspect, in some cases such as sexual abuse, rape and violence, the police will conduct medical examination to victims’ body. In this point, the role of victims in investigation is important, thus victims should not be entitled to representation during the investigation.

While the role of victims in investigations stage of common law systems is still important, the victim’s role at the court trial is otherwise. In the trial court of adversarial system, the public prosecutor presumably represents victims. Indeed, victims will testify and give evidence in trial but it is subjected to cross examination by prosecutor and defense so they are not allowed to speak freely about the impact of the crime both physically or mentally.[15] Yet, victims have no power to force prosecution, and to determine the sentence imposed to the offender.[16] If the accused plead guilty, the victims will not be involved in the next stage of his/her case and the victims will not be informed about the fate of accused.[17] Private prosecutor who fights for victim’s interest is abandoned so if the victims do not want to testify in the court, they will lose opportunity to be involved in the court.[18] Therefore the victims should be entitled to representation during trial court. In adversarial systems, the victims can be represented by Victim Impact Statements.

Victim impact Statements give chance to the victims to describe the impact of crime or how suffer the victims are.[19] In Canada, the term victim was not recognized in Criminal Code until the introduction of victim impact statements in 1988.[20] In England and Wales, victim impact statements were introduced on 1 October 2001. Besides giving victims opportunity to express their suffering, victims may add in their statements any relevant information which is helpful to support them and their need of compensation from the offender.[21]

The exception of victim’s representation during trial court in common law systems is Republic of Ireland. In the case of sexual abuse, there is a mechanism that allows victims to be represented by their own counsel in a voir dire[22] when the defence introduces evidence in sexual history of the victim and the accused.[23] Having said that, it should be addressed that all of victim impact statements in those countries will lead victims to have bigger opportunity in criminal justice systems and eventually may improve justice.[24]

Victim’s role in civil law systems.

In civil law, victim is important source of information to reveal the crime both in investigation and trial court stage. In investigation, victims will be asked to give information related to the crime and testify what has happened. In some cases, particularly serious crimes, the investigator/police may make a reenactment. Reenactment is procedure where the accused have to reenact how he/she did the crime. Reenactment will be done in the presence of witnesses, victims (or someone on behalf of victim in murder case), police, judge, prosecutor and defense. [25] In Indonesia, reenactment is called as reconstruction. The purpose of reconstruction is to ensure the prosecutor about the guilty of the accused and to prove whether the accused has given the truth information.[26] Beside the reenactment, the investigator (could be police or investigating judge) may order a confrontation. Confrontation is a procedure to confront a statement of accused in one hand and the victims and witnesses on the other hand. The purpose of confrontation is to find the truth of the case by exercise alibi, version and information from any other sides.[27] As same as adversarial, the victim in inquisitorial system may also be asked to medical examination in order to prove some evidences scientifically. In these occasions (testify, reenactment, confrontation and medical examination) the presence of victims is crucial. Therefore, the victims should not be represented.

At the trial court, the role of victims may be greater than in investigation stage. Victims may make claims for compensation from offender[28] and have the right to become private prosecutor to fight the case on their own[29]. Victim can be legally represented by civil party such as in French,[30] or represented by an attorney such as in Germany and Poland, which is called as Nebenklage.[31]

In France, the victims are allowed to legally representation by civil party. Civil party could be members of victim’s family and other parties who involved in the case, such as insurance company, trade unions, human rights activists, women organization and so on.[32] Civil party has a right to enter the trial officially and function as ‘an additional prosecutor’.[33] The purposes of civil party are to pursue the claim of damages and take the effect of crime as consideration in sentencing.

In Germany and Poland, the victims are allowed to represent by an attorney as an auxiliary prosecutor. This system is called as nebenklage. Wemmers, (2005) claim that :

‘[A]s Nebenklager, victims have access to the prosecutor’s investigatory file, have the right to  be heard at and present throughout trial, the right to file evidentiary motions, the rights to bring challenging motions against judges or experts, the right to ask question and make objections statements, including closing statements and the right to appeal an acquittal.’[34]

By these representations, victims should not attend to the court personally but they are still involved in the process of criminal justice system and pursue their needs.

Conclusion.

In investigation, both in civil law and common law, the presence of the victims is important to guide investigator to reveal the case. Based on victim’s information, investigator can determine and detain the suspect and collecting supporting evidence. Beside as a witness, victims can be used as evidence especially in case of rape, murder, abuse and any other cases which is caused physically injuries. Therefore the victims should not be entitled to representation during investigation.

In trial court adversarial systems, the victims have no formally access to the court. The prosecutor will bring the case and has authority independently without any consideration to victim’s interest. Hence, the victims should be entitled to representation at trial to pursue their interest. In adversarial court, victims can be represented by victims impact statement, whereby the victims can describe the impact of crime and the victim’s needs. In inquisitorial systems, the presence of victims at trial court is crucial. Based on testimony of the victims, the judge can decide whether the accused is guilty and what the sentence is. However, victims also can be represented by another party who is related to the victims interest, for instance, civil party (in French) and nebenklage (in Poland and Germany). Therefore in inquisitorial trial court, the victims may be entitled to representation. It means in some parts of trial process the victims should attend personally, but in other parts the victims may be represented.

[1] Julie Gardner, 3.

[2] Ibid 4

[3] Bron Mckillop, The position of accused person…..516.

[4] ibid 516.

[5] Antonio Casesse, 366.

[6] Mckillop, above n3

[7] ibid

[8] Rudolf B Schlesinger et al, 310.

[9] Mckillop, 366

[10] Above n 8, 224-54

[11] Ibid, 231.

[12] Edna erez.

[13] Above n 10, 47. See Mckillop 2003, 529.

[14] David Brown et al, 193.

[15] Jo-Anne Wemmers, 124.

[16] Edna erez, 48.

[17] Mckillop, 2003, 529.

[18] Edna erez 48.

[19] Jo anne wemmers, 124.

[20] Jo anne, 124.

[21] Joanne 124.

[22] In Oxford, Dictionary of Law (2003), page 529 there is explanation about Voir Dire. VoirDire is a French term, means “speak the truth”. This term refers to the preliminary examination by judge to determine his competence or of a juror to determine his qualification for jury service. Voir Dire is sometimes called as “trial within a trial”.

[23] Jonathan Doak, 296.

[24] Edna erez, 48.

[25] Mckillop. 2002,51.

[26] Indonesian Criminal Procedure, known as Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana  (KUHAP) art. 184.

[27] Mckillop, 2002, 51.

[28] Mckillop 2002, 56.

[29] Edna erez, 49.

[30] Mckillop 2003, 529, 2002, 63, instructivness mc killop 8.

[31] Jo Anne wemmers.

[32] Mckillopp. Instructuivenes , 8.

[33] Mckillop, What can we learn from French criminal justice systems (2002), 63.

[34] Jo anne wemmers

OVER NON-PARTY NATIONALS

By: Sambodo Purnomo Yogo, SIK, MTCP

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established on 17 July 1998 in Rome[1]. ICC is a permanent international tribunal to prosecute individuals who commit atrocious crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression.[2] By 11 April 2002, 139 states had signed the Rome statute and 66 states had taken additional steps to ratify the statute. After 60 required ratifications, the Rome statute was enforced internationally on 1 July 2002.[3] However, there are some states that have not signed the Rome statute of ICC because in their point of view the ICC could endanger both their sovereignty as states and their citizens.[4] As state non-parties, based on the Vienna Convention on the Laws and Treaties, article 34, they are not bound by the statute.[5] Nonetheless, there are some conditions in which the jurisdiction of the ICC may be exercised over their nationalities. This synopsis is a summary of several references about the ICC, particularly the jurisdiction of the ICC over non-party nationals. Non-party national means an individual who has the nationality of the state non-party of the ICC. There are two parts of the Rome statute of the ICC that determines the jurisdiction of the ICC over non-party nationals. These are the scope of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC.

Jurisdiction of the ICC

Jurisdiction refers to the legal parameters of the ICC. There are four types of jurisdiction. These are subject matter (ratione materiae), time (ratione temporis), territory (ratione loci) and individual (ratione personae).[6] Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the crimes that may be prosecuted by the ICC: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.[7] Time jurisdiction means the ICC has jurisdiction only if crimes are committed after the state entry into the force of the statute. If crimes are committed before the state party entry into the force, the state should make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.[8] On the other hand, the ICC guarantees that no one can be investigated or prosecuted under the statute if the crime is committed before statute entry into the force (non-retroactive).[9] The territory jurisdiction means the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes that are committed in the territories of the state parties or the state non-parties that accept the jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis designated by the Security Council (SC).[10] Personal jurisdiction means the ICC has jurisdiction over individuals who have committed crimes in the jurisdiction of the ICC (individual responsibility).[11] The individual must have the nationality of a state party or nationality of state non-parties that have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.[12] The individual must be above 18 years old at the time he/she committed the crime and must attend the trial of the ICC (trial in absentia is not permitted).[13]

Besides jurisdiction, the Rome statute also recognizes the admissibility of the ICC. Admissibility refers to the legal condition where the ICC is admissible to be enforced. With regard to the ‘Complementarily Principle’[14]. The ICC’s jurisdiction is inadmissible to be exercised if the accused person has been investigated by a domestic Court in the state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is “unwilling or /and unable” to investigate or prosecute the case.[15]

Exercise of   Jurisdiction

In article 13 The Rome Statute, there are three triggers to exercise the jurisdiction of the ICC. Firstly, state parties refer the case to the prosecutor of the ICC. Secondly, the Security Council (SC) refers the case to the prosecutor of the ICC. Thirdly, the prosecutor initiates the investigation (propio motu). [16] Some scholars, like Cameron (2004, p.81) define this mechanism as the “triggering mechanism” of the ICC.[17] In addition, state non-parties may refer the crimes to ICC, but they have to declare that they have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC, on the basis of an ad hoc agreement.[18]

Jurisdiction of the ICC over non-party nationals

Based on the ICC’s jurisdiction (subject matter, time, territory and personal) and triggering mechanism of the ICC, there are three conditions where the ICC may have jurisdiction over non-party nationals. Firstly, where the crime is committed in the territory of a state party or in the territory of state non-parties that have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.[19] Secondly, if the case has been referred to the ICC by the SC.[20] Thirdly, the ICC may have jurisdiction over non-party nationals, if the state non-party (the nationality of the accused person) has declared to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the crime.[21]

In conditions where crimes are committed by non-party nationals in the territory of a state party, the ICC will have jurisdiction regardless of the nationality of the accused.[22] This means, if a state party, where the crime is committed, refers the case to the ICC, the jurisdiction of the ICC will be exercised without consent of the state non-parties (the nationality of accused person).

However, debatable argumentation arises around the issue of legal basis for the exercising of the ICC’s jurisdiction without consent of the state. In this issue, the opposition of The United States (US) to the ICC can be used as an example. Actually, the U.S. signed the Rome statute of International Criminal Court (ICC) on 31 December 2000, but in May 2002, the U.S. formally notified the United Nations (UN) that the U.S. was no longer a member party of the ICC.[23] The U.S. refused to be a state party because the statute of ICC has some flaws that could make the ICC harmful for U.S. sovereignty and threaten the lives of U.S. citizens.[24] As one of the state non-parties, the US, argues that there is no legal basis for the ICC to implement its jurisdiction over non-party nationals. Moreover the exercise of the ICC without consent of the state non-party would be contrary to international law.[25] With regard to this issue, Akande (2004) argues that the crimes under ICC’s jurisdiction are atrocious crimes that are condemned by the international community. Therefore, international law, with regard to universal jurisdiction, requires all states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over these crimes.  At this point,  Akande (2004) claims that the ICC is a joint authority of the state to prosecute. So, the delegation of criminal jurisdiction from state parties to the ICC is lawful.[26]

Another possibility to exercise the jurisdiction of the ICC over national of non-parties is in conditions where the case is referred by SC. In this case, as well as when the crime is committed in territory of a state party, the consent of the state non-parties is unnecessary. The SC, in accordance to chapter VII[27] of the UN charter, could refer the crime to the ICC as a triggering mechanism of the ICC. However, it is still questionable because it will not succeed if one or more of the permanent members of the SC who have a right to “veto” (the US, the UK, France, Russian and Chinese) use its veto. It could happen if the nationality of the accused person is one of the permanent members or they (one or more of the permanent members) have a special interest to protect the state of the accused. Moreover, the SC has a “deferral” right to postpone the investigation of the ICC.[28] So, instead of supporting the ICC, this situation could lead to a clash between the SC and the ICC[29].

While in the first two conditions, the jurisdiction of the ICC over state non-parties may be exercised without consent of the state non-party, in the third condition, the jurisdiction of the ICC may be exercised if the state non-party has consented to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to the crime.[30] However, the ICC does not compel any obligation to the state non-party.[31] Thus, the desire to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC depends very much on the intention of the state in respect to the crime.

In conclusion, there are three conditions where the jurisdiction of the ICC may be exercised over non-party nationals. In the first two conditions, the jurisdiction of the ICC may be exercised without the consent of the state non-parties. These are the conditions where the crime is committed in the territory of state parties or territory of state non-parties that has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC and the condition where the case is referred by SC. In these two conditions, there is debate whether the jurisdiction of the ICC over state non-parties without its consent is acceptable with regard to international law. A debatable question also arises in the issue of the veto right of permanent members of SC. The last condition is a condition where the jurisdiction of the ICC may be exercised over state non-parties by the consent of the state. In this condition, the willingness of the state is crucial because there is no obligation for state non-parties to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.

Bibliography.

Akande, Dapo, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over National of Non Parties : legal Basis and Limit’ in Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (eds) The Library of Essay In International law: The International Criminal Court ( 2004).

Broomhal, Bruce, International Justice and the International Criminal Court (2004).

Cameron, Ian, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility Issue under the ICC Statute’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnely (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court : Legal and Policy Issues (2004).

Elsea, Jenifer, International Criminal Court : Overview and Selected Legal Issues (2003).

Fehl, Caroline, ‘Explaining the International Criminal Court: A Practice Test for Rationalist and Constructive Approaches’ (2004) 10 (3) European Journal of International Relation, 357-96.

Holmes, T, John, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’ in Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (eds) The Library of Essay In International law: The International Criminal Court ( 2004).

McGoldrick, Dominic, ‘Political and Legal Responses to the ICC’, in Dominick McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnely (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court (2004).

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court’, Report 45 (2002).

Sarooshi, Dan, ‘The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council’ in Dominick McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnely (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court (2004).

Schabas, A, William, ‘An Introduction to the International Criminal Court’ (2001).

Schabas, A Williams, ‘United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all about the Security Council’ (2004) 15 (4) European Journal of International Law, 710-720.

‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, opened for signature 17 July 1998,

(entered into force 1 July 2002).

‘Charter of The United Nations’, signed 26 June 1945, enter into force 24 October 1945.

Wikipidea, ‘International Criminal Court’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court> at 24 February 2006.

[2] Jenifer Elsea, International Criminal Court : Overview and Selected Legal Issues (2003),1.

[3] The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court’,  Report 45 (2002) 1. See also Appendix D of this report for list of signatories.

[4] See Bruce Broomhal, International Justice  and the International Criminal Court (2004)  pp163-183,

see also Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Political and Legal Responses to the ICC’, in Dominick McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnely (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court (2004) 400-460. see also Wikipidea, ‘International Criminal Court’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court at 24 February 2006

[5] Dan Sarooshi, ‘The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council’ in Dominick McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnely (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court (2004) 104.

[6] William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001), 55.

[7] In Rome statute, there are specific provisions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, however there is no explanation about aggression crime. Therefore, the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction in crime of aggression unless and until the states parties define provision of this crime in the statute.

See Ibid, 56,  See  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998,

art 5 (entered into force 1 July 2002). See also The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 3, 5.

[8] Schabas, above n 6, 56 . See also Rome statute art.11.

[9] The Rome Statute art 24.

[10] The Rome Statute, art 12 and art 87.

[11] The Roma Statute art.25

[12] Schabas, above n 6, 63.

[13] Ian Cameron, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility Issue under the ICC Statute’, in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter       Rowe and Eric Donnely (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issue (2004) 71.

[14] Complementarity principle means the ICC is complementary of .a national jurisdiction. It is written in Preamble of the Rome Statute “[E]mphasizing that the ICC established under this statute shall be complementarity to national criminal jurisdictions”. See John T. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’ in Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (eds) The Library of Essay In International law: The International Criminal Court , ( 2004) 667-86.

[15] The Rome Statute art.17, See Cameron, above n 11, 83.

[16] The prosecutor can get information from any other sources (sates parties, NGO, UN organs and so on), and  if the prosecutor decide whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed, he/she will request authorization from Pre Trial Chamber to make an investigation. See Rome Statute art 13, art 15 and art 53. See also Cameron, above n 11, 81-2.

[17] Cameron, above n 13,81.

[18] Ibid, 82. See Roma Statute art 87.

[19] Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal basis and Limits’ (2003), 1, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 618.

[20] Ibid, 619.

[21] Ibid, 619.

[22] Scabhas, above n 6,  62.

[23] Caroline Fehl, ‘Explaining the International Criminal Court : A Practice Test for Rationalist and Constructive Approaches’ (2004) 10 (3) European Journal of International Relation, 357.

[24] William A Schabas, ‘United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all about the Security Council’ (2004) 15 (4) European Journal of International Law, 710-720.

[25] Akande, above n 19, 620.

[26] Ibid, 625.

[27] Chapter VII of the UN Charter describe the rights of SC to determine such actions which threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and take some measure to overcome these actions. See Charter of The United Nations, signed 26 June 1945, enter into force 24 October 1945.

[28] Rome Statute art 16. See Schabas, above n 6,  64.

[29] Sarooshi, above n 5, 105-109. See Rome Statute art 16.

[30] Rome Statute art 12.

[31] Akande, above n 19, 620.

DALAM MENGATASI RESISTENSI ANGGOTA TERHADAP

PERUBAHAN PARADIGMA POLISI SIPIL

By : Sambodo Purnomo Yogo, SIK, MTCP

I.          PENDAHULUAN

Paradigma Kepolisian Sipil bagi Polri selalu dikaitkan dengan momentum pemisahan TNI – Polri sebagai hasil dari reformasi. Pemisahan (kemandirian) Polri itu sendiri bagi Polri bukanlah sebagai tujuan tetapi sebagi langkah dimulainya perubahan menuju paradigma baru Polri yaitu paradigma Kepolsian Sipil. Walau  sampai saat ini proses transisi masih terus berjalan, bahkan disebutkan bahwa Polisi Indonesia kini walaupun tidak lagi berkarakter militer, tetapi baru sekedar ”a civilian in uniform” atau orang sipil yang diberi baju seragam.[1]

Setiap perubahan yang berhasil selalu dipimpin oleh seorang pemimpin yang dianggap sebagai ”The Change Maker” (Si pembuat perubahan). Rhenald Khasali, dalam bukunya ”Change” menggambarkan bahwa pemimpin-pemimpin perubahan itu mempunyai jiwa dan semangat serta komitmen yang kuat untuk melakukan perubahan-perubahan pada organisasi atau bangsanya. Contohnya adalah Lee Kwan Yeuw di Singapura, Roby Johan di Garuda, dan Cacuk Sudaryanto di Telkom.[2]

Keberadaan seorang pemimpin yang kuat merupakan faktor penentu dalam berhasil atau tidaknya suatu organisasi dalam melakukan perubahan untuk menyesuaikan dengan perubahan lingkungan strategis organisasi tersebut. Demikian juga halnya dengan organisasi Polri yang saat ini sedang dalam dalam masa transisi untuk melakukan perubahan menuju kearah paradigma kepolisian sipil, dibutuhkan pemimpin-pemimpin yang visioner dan mampu untuk memimpin organisasi Polri menuju kerah perubahan.

Setiap perubahan pasti ada yang mendukung dan ada yang menolak atau resisten terhadap perubahan tersebut. Kepemimpinan yang visioner menjadi vital bagi organisasi Polri terutama dalam menghadapi resistensi dari para personil yang tidak mau melakukan perubahan. Karena resistensi ini akan menjadi masalah dalam organisasi, bahkan orang – orang yang resisten akan dianggap sebagai ”benalu kemajuan”, akan ditinggal dan bahkan disingkirkan dari organisasi Polri karena dianggap anti perubahan.[3]

Oleh sebab itu, permasalahan yang akan dibahas dalam tulisan ini adalah ”Bagaimanakah aktualisasi kepemimpinan yang visioner dalam menghadapi resistensi personil pada perubahan paradigma polisi sipil?”. Untuk lebih memudahkan dalam pembahasan maka permasalahan tersebut dipecah menajdi beberapa persoalan, yaitu:

1. Apakah yang dimaksud dengan kepemimpinan yang visioner?
2. Bagaimanakah konsep paradigma kepolisian sipil?
3. Upaya apa yang dapat dilakukan oleh seorang pimpinan Polri untuk mengatasai resistensi terhadap perubahan menuju paradigma kepolisian sipil?

II.        PEMBAHASAN

1. 1. Kepemimpinan Visioner

Kepemimpinan Visioner, adalah pola kepemimpinan yang ditujukan untuk memberi arti pada kerja dan usaha yang dilakukan bersama-sama oleh para anggota perusahaan dengan cara memberi arahan dan makna pada kerja dan usaha yang dilakukan berdasarkan visi yang jelas.[4] Dari penegertian ini terlihat bahwa pemimpin yang visioner harus mempunyai visi yang jelas kearah mana organisasi itu akan dibawa. Dari sisi ini pemimpin Polri yang Visioner harus mampu membawa organisasinya kearah Visi Polri yaitu ”Terwujudnya postur Polri yang profesional, bermoral dan modern sebagai pelindung, pelayan dan pengayom masyarakat yang terpercaya dalam melindungi masyarakat dan menegakkan hukum”.[5]

Burt Nanus (1992),  mengungkapkan ada empat peran yang harus dimainkan oleh pemimpin visioner dalam melaksanakan  kepemimpinannya, yaitu:

1. Peran penentu arah (direction setter). Peran ini merupakan peran di mana  seorang pemimpin menyajikan suatu visi, meyakinkan gambaran atau target untuk suatu organisasi, guna diraih pada masa depan,
2. Agen perubahan (agent of change). Agen perubahan merupakan peran penting kedua dari seorang pemimpin visioner. Dia harus mampu menjadi pelopor bagi organisasi untuk melakukan perubahan.
3. Juru bicara (spokesperson). Pemimpin, sebagai juru bicara untuk visi, harus mengkomunikasikan suatu pesan yang mengikat semua orang agar melibatkan diri dan menyentuh visi organisasi.
4. Pelatih (coach). Pemimpin, sebagai pelatih, menjaga pekerja untuk memusatkan pada realisasi visi dengan pengarahan, memberi harapan, dan membangun kepercayaan di antara pemain yang penting bagi organisasi dan visinya untuk masa depan. [6]

2.         Paradigma Polisi Sipil

Ada banyak pendapat para ahli tentang Polisi Sipil. Salah satunya adalah dari Institute For Defense Strategy and Peace Studies (IDSPS). Lembaga ini menberikan definisi dari Polisi Sipil sebagai berikut:

1. Polisi Sipil adalah Polisi yang menghormati hak – hak sipil, serta mampu mengawal nilai – nilai sipil seperti demokrasi, akuntabel, transparan dan lain – lain.
2. Polisi Sipil mengedepankan pendekatan kemanusian dan padanya melekat sikap budaya yang sopan, santun, ramah, dan persuasif.
3. Polisi Sipil mengabdi pada kepentingan rakyat. Dalam hal ini polisi harus mewujudkan pola kerja yang humanis dan menyayangi masyarakat, dengan mengedepankan komunikasi dengan rakyat. [7]

Terkait dengan paradigma polisi sipil, perubahan dari kultur militer ke kultur sipil tersebut memerlukan adaptasi yang intensif, tidak saja mengganti atribut atribut yang berbau militer dengan atribut-atribut yang lebih berwajah sipil (civilian style blazer)[8], tetapi juga melalui berbagai upaya organisasi yang meliputi perubahan pada aspek struktural, instrumental maupun kultural. Dalam proses perubahan inilah dimungkinkan adanya resistensi dari anggota.

3.         Upaya Mengatasi Resistensi terhadap Perubahan Paradigma Polisi Sipil

Sebagaimana telah disampaikan dimuka bahwa setiap perubahan pasti menimbulkan resistensi dari para anggota organisasi, termasuk dalam hal ini adalah resistensi dari anggota Polri terhadap perubahan paradigma kepolisian sipil. Penulis berpendapat Resistensi itu ditimbulkan oleh beberapa hal, antara lain:

-                      Perubahan tersebut menimbulkan ketakutan kepada anggota bahwa akan terjadi perubahan yang signifikan terhadap budaya kerja Polri yang lebih transparan dan akuntabel sehingga mengeliminir penyalah gunaan wewenang.

-                      Anggota berada pada zona kenyamanan (comfort zone) dimana mereka menikmati polisi yang bersifat militeristik, yang mana mereka seolah-olah mempunyai kewenangan tanpa batas dan dapat memperlakukan masyarakat dengan sekehendaknya.

-                      Paradigma polisi sipil dianggap akan membuat anggota kehilangan semua kemudahan dan fasilitas diluar dinas, yang selama ini diperoleh dalam statusnya sebagai anggota polisi. Akibatnya mereka akan kehilangan sebagian penghasilan mereka diluar gaji, yang selama ini didapat dengan cara-cara yang tidak benar.

Terkait dengan masalah resistensi, Kotter dan Schlesinger (1979) memperkenalkan teori untuk mengatasi resistensi terhadap perubahan organisasi. Mereka menyatakan bahwa ada 6 hal yang dapat dilakukan seorang pemimpin untuk mengatasi resistensi, yaitu melalui Komunikasi, Patisipasi, Fasilitasi, Negosiasi, Manipulasi dan Paksa.[9]

Dikaitkan dengan pola kepemimpinan yang visioner, maka yang dapat dilakukan untuk mengatasi resistensi terhadap perubahan paradigma polisi sipil adalah:

1. Komunikasi: Sebagai Spoke Person, Pemimpin harus memberikan informasi tentang paradigma polisi sipil dan memberikan alasan – alasan logis mengapa perubahan paradigma itu harus dilakukan oleh Polri.
2. Partisipasi: Sebagai agent of change, pemimpin harus melibatkan anggota untuk terlibat dalam pengambilan keputusan terkait dengan perubahan paradigma polisi sipil, seperti contohnya, cara-cara patroli, peningkatan pelayanan masyarakat dan lain-lain. Dengan demikian anggota akan mempunyai komitmen terhadap perubahan tersebut.
3. Fasilitasi: Sebagai Coach, pemimpin harus memfasilitasi perubahan sikap dan perilaku dengan cara memberikan pelatihan-pelatihan, dan menganalisa area-area penugasan mana yang mengalami resistensi untuk dicarikan jalan kelauarnya.
4. Negoisasi: Sebagai direction setter,pemimpin menegosiasiakan alasan resistensi anggota baik secara formal maupun informal, sehingga terdapat win-win solution bagi anggota maupun organisasi.
5. Manipulasi: Sebagai direction setter, pemimpin menggunakan kekuasaannya untuk memanipulasi kepatuhan, antara lain dengan memberikan pengharagaan (reward) bagi anggota yang mau untuk berubah.
6. Paksa: Sebagai direction setter, Pemimpin memberikan paksaan dengan cara melakukan punishment terhadap anggota yang tetap tidak mau berubah, dan tetap melakukan cara-cara yang bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai sipil, walaupun telah diberi penjelasan tentang perubahan paradigma polisi sipil.

III.       PENUTUP

1. 1. Kesimpulan
2. Kepemimpinan yang visioner adalah kepemimpinan yang selalu menggunakan visi organisasi sebagai pedoaman arah tujuan organisasi. Dikaitkan dengan perubahan, pemimpin yang visioner mempunyai 4 fungsi yaitu sebagai penentu kebijakan (direction setter), juru bicara (spoke person), pelopor perubahan (agent of change) dan pelatih perubahan (coach)
3. Paradigma Kepolsian sipil adalah kepolsian yang mengedepankan nilai – nilai sipil seperti demokrasi, transparansi dan akuntabel, dalam pelaksanaan tugasnya serta selalu mengabdi pada kepentingan rakyat.
4. Upaya untuk mengatasi resistensi dalam perubahan paradigma dilakuakn melalui 6 cara yaitu Komunikasi, Patisipasi, Fasilitasi, Negosiasi, Manipulasi dan Paksaan.
5. 2. Saran
6. Perlu ada suatu mekanisme reward and punishment yang jelas dalam memotivasi anggota untuk mau berubah .
7. Untuk menentukan apakah seseorang itu adalah pemimpin yang visoner, maka perlu diadakan ”fit and proper test” internal, terutama dalam mengisi jabatan-jabatan kepala kesatauan baik pembinaan maupun operasioanal, termasuk Kasatwil dari segala tingkatan , mulai dari kapolsek hiongga Kapolda.

DAFTAR PUSTAKA

1. Amanat Kapolri Pada pembukaan Sespim Dikreg 48 TA 2009, 12 febriari 2009.
2. Buku I, Program Kerja Akselerasi Transformasi Polri Menuju Polri Yang mandiri, Profesional dan Dipercaya Masyarakat, Kep KaPolri No.Pol: Kep/37/X/2008, tanggal 27 Oktober 2008
3. IDSPS, “Reformasi Kepolisian Indonesia”, Seri 6 Backgrounder, Juni 2008.
4. Kartanegara Diana, ”Strategi Membangun Eksekutif. [Online]. http://www.pln.co.id/fokus/ArtikelTunggal.asp?ArtikelId= 268, 2003
5. Rhenald Kasali, “Change”, PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2006.
6. Satjipto Raharjo, ”Membangun Polisi Sipil, Perspektif Hukum, Sosial dan kemasyarakatan”, Kompas, Jakarta, Hal xxi.
7. Sunarto, Menuju Polisi Sipil yang Profesional, http://www.lampungpost.com/cetak/cetak.php?id=2007070203512668
8. Wahid Suhar, “Kepemimpinan Visioner” http://id.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?, 2008

[2] Rhenald Kasali, “Change”, PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2006.

[3] Amanat Kapolri pada Pembukaan Pendidikan Sespim Dikreg 48 TA 2009, tanggal 12 Februari 2009.

[4]Kartanegara Diana, ”Strategi Membangun Eksekutif. [Online]. http://www.pln.co.id/fokus/ArtikelTunggal.asp?ArtikelId= 268, 2003

[5] Buku I, Program Kerja Akselerasi Transformasi Polri Menuju Polri Yang mandiri, Profesional dan   Dipercaya Masyarakat, Kep KaPolri No.Pol: Kep/37/X/2008, tanggal 27 Oktober 2008

[6] Wahid Suhar, “Kepemimpinan Visioner” http://id.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?, 2008

[7] IDSPS, “Reformasi Kepolisian Indonesia”, Seri 6 Backgrounder, Juni 2008.

[8] Sunarto, Menuju Polisi Sipil yang Profesional, http://www.lampungpost.com/cetak/cetak.php?id=2007070203512668

[9] Rhenald Kasali, “Change”, PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2006

GUNA MENCIPTAKAN OPINI PUBLIK YANG POSITIF TERHADAP POLRI

By : SAMBODO PURNOMO YOGO, SIK, MTCP

I.          PENDAHULUAN

Opini publik yang terbentuk di masyarakat belakangan ini harus diakui kurang begitu menggembirakan. Pencitraan positif yang dibangun sebagai komitmen menuju profesionalisme polisi, ternyata sering “dikotori” oleh ulah oknumnya sendiri sehingga polisi didera vonis yang negatif. Buruknya citra polri tersebut tercermin dari hasil survey Transparency International Indonesia (TII) menyatakan, kepolisian menjadi institusi dengan tingkat suap tertinggi. Menurut Manajer Riset dan Kebijakan Transparency, Frenky Simanjuntak, praktek penyuapan di kepolisian mencapai 40 persen. Jumlah ini dihitung berdasarkan rasio total transaksi responden dan pelaku bisnis terhadap institusi kepolisian dengan transaksi suap rata-rata mencapai Rp 2,3 juta.[1]

Berbicara tentang opini publik terhadap Polri apakah positif atau negatif, tentunya tidak hanya tergantung kepada bagaimana Polri dalam pelaksanaan tugasnya selalu profesional dan sesuai harapan publik, akan tetapi juga tergantung pada bagaimana publik menerima informasi tentang apa yang telah dilakukan Polri dan keberhasilan-keberhasilan yang telah dicapai Polri dalam pelaksanaan tugasnya.Disisi lain, opini publik yang positif sangat diperlukan institusi Polri dalam menjalankan tugas pokoknya, hal ini dikarenakan opini publik yang positif akan membentuk citra Polri yang positif pula, yang pada akhirnya dapat berakibat meningkatnya kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap Polri.

Media massa sebagai salah satu pembentuk opini publik sangat berperan dalam proses pembentukan citra. Melalui media massa bisa didisain proses pembentukan opini publik, sehingga hal-hal positif yang sudah dilakukan Polri bisa diketahui masyarakat. Efek yang diharapkan adalah munculnya apresiasi masyarakat terhadap Polri.

Mengacu pada ilustrasi tersebut, maka permasalahan dalam tulisan ini adalah: “bagaimanakah membangun opini publik yang positif terhadap Polri melalui komunikasi efektif antara Polri dan media massa? Pokok persoalan sebagai acuan dalam membahas permasalahan tersebut adalah:

1. Apakah yang dimaksud Opini Publik serta bagaimana keterkaitannya dengan peran Media Massa?
2. Apakah yang dimaksud Komunikasi Efektif, dan bagaimana aktualisasinya dalam membangun interaksi antara Media Massa dan Polri guna menciptakan opini publik yang positif?

II.        PEMBAHASAN

1. Opini Publik dan Peran Pers / Media Massa

Dalam pasal 1 Undang – Undang no 40 Tahun 1999 tentang Pers disebutkan bahwa pers adalah lembaga sosial dan wahana komunikasi massa yang melaksanakan kegiatan jurnalistik meliputi mencari, memperoleh, memiliki, menyimpan, mengolah, dan menyampaikan informasi baik dalam bentuk tulisan, suara, gambar, suara dan gambar, serta data dan grafik maupun dalam bentuk lainnya dengan menggunakan media cetak, media elektronik, dan segala jenis saluran yang tersedia. Pers mempunyai fungsi sebagai media informasi, pendidikan, hiburan dan kontrol sosial. (Pasal 3 UU No. 40 Thn 1999)

Pers / Media massa sebagai ruang publik memiliki peran sebagai wahana informasi dan sebagai ruang masyarakat untuk memperoleh informasi, hal ini sejalan dengan pendapat Harsono (2004) dalam Adiwinoto (2007) yang menyatakan bahwa : “Media massa cetak dan elektronik merupakan ruang masyarakat untuk memperoleh informasi yang berkaitan dengan kehidupan sosialnya”.[2]

Melihat pemahaman tersebut di atas nampak bahwa media massa memegang peranan penting dalam membentuk Opini Publik. Karena informasi yang disajikan oleh media massa kepada publik, terlepas apakah berita tersebut benar sesuai fakta atau hanya pendapat seseorang atau wartawannya saja, akan memberikan pengaruh pada pembentukan opini publik terhadap yang diberitakan/ disampaikan.

Opini publik adalah unsur-unsur dari pandangan, perspektif dan tanggapan masyarakat mengenai suatu kejadian, keadaan, dan desas-desus tentang peristiwa-peristiwa tertentu. Menurut John Dewey, “Public is about the what of belonging to the people; relating to, or affecting, a nation, state, or community; opposed to private. (Publik adalah tentang apa yang dimiliki oleh orang orang : hubungan, perasaan/ emosi, bangsa atau suatu komunitas.[3]

William L. Rivers dan kawan-kawannya (Rivers 2003:ix) mengatakan bahwa pada dasarnya, kondisi di dunia nyata mempengaruhi media massa, dan ternyata keberadaan media massa juga dapat mempengaruhi kondisi nyata dunia.[4] Hal ini dikarenakan isi media massa merupakan konsumsi otak bagi khalayaknya, sehingga apa yang ada di media massa akan mempengaruhi realitas subjektif pelaku interaksi sosial. Gambaran tentang realitas yang dibentuk oleh isi media massa inilah yang nantinya mendasari respon dan sikap khalayak terhadap berbagai objek sosial.

Peran media dalam membentuk opini publik semakin terbuka lebar sejak era reformasi dimana kebebasan Pers mengarah terjadinya liberalisasi Pers sehingga informasi yang disampaikan kepada masyarakat cenderung tidak objektif, karena sudah mulai adanya muatan dan kepentingan terutama dari pihak media/Pers, bahkan muncul Pameo/istilah “ Bad News is Good News”.

2.         Konsep Komunikasi Efektif

Komunikasi pada prinsipnya adalah proses penyampaian pikiran atau perasaan oleh seseorang (komunikator) kepada orang lain (komunikan). Pikiran tersebut bisa merupakan gagasan, informasi, opini dll[5]. Teori Komunikasi yang paling terkenal adalah Laswell yang mengatakan bahwa proses komunikasi menyangkut “who says in what channel to whom with what effect”.

Dari definisi tersebut, terdapat unsur – unsur komunikasi yaitu:

-           Siapa yang mengatakan (who) disebut sebagai sumber atau komunikator

-           Apa (what ) disebut sebagai pesan

-           Kepada siapa (to whom) disebut sebagai penerima atau komunikan

-           Dengan cara bagaimana (how / in what chanel) disebut sebagai media.

-           Dengan tujuan apa (in what effect) disebut sebagi tujuan

Bungin (2006) membagi tujuan komunikasi dalam 4 hal yaitu, Perubahan sikap (attitude change), perubahan pendapat (opinion change), perubahan prilaku (behaviour change), perubahan sosial (social change).[6] Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut dibutuhkan suatu komunikasi yang efektif. Hal itu sesuai dengan pendapat seorang sarjana komunikasi, Emerson, ”Komunikasi yang dapat mencapai tujuan atau sasaran yang telah ditentukan oleh komunikator adalah komunikasi yang dikatakan efektif”.[7]

Dilihat dari jenis komunikasi dalam masyarakat, Komunikasi Polri dengan pers / media massa adalah termasuk dalam komunikasi massa. Mc Quil (1994) dalam Bungin (2006) menyatakan bahwa ada beberapa ciri – ciri komunikasi massa yaitu sumbernya adalah organisasi formal, pengirmnya adalah profesioanl, bersifat impersonal dan pesannya beragam serta mempunyai nilai jual.[8]

3.         Membangun Komunikasi Efektif antara Polri dan Media Massa

Polri sebagai organisasi publik sangat rentan dengan adanya opini publik yang subyektif. Kerentanan ini dikaitkan dengan eksistensi Polri dalam tugasnya selalu bersentuhan dengan masyarakat. Kondisi ini yang mengharuskan Polri menjalin interaksi sinergis dengan Media Massa yang diposisikan sebagai kepanjangan suara organisasi organisasi.

Komunikasi yang efektif antara Polri dan Media Massa berarti Polri mampu untuk mempengaruhi Media Massa agar mempunyai sikap, pendapat, perilaku dan persepsi yang sesuai dengan yang diinginkan oleh Polri. Bila Media Massa sudah dapat dipengaruhi maka diharapkan pemberitaan yang muncul akan positif dan pada gilirannya akan menimbulkan opini publik yang positif terhadap Polri.

Untuk membangun Komunikasi Efektif maka komunikan (penerima pesan) dalam hal ini media massa harus percaya terhadap komunikator (pengirim pesan), dalam hal ini adalah Polri. Kredibilitas Polri menjadi modal utama agar komunikasi Polri dengan media Massa menjadi efektif. Namun kredibilitas bukan hal yang mudah. Hal ini bisa hilang ketika “komunikator”(Polri), “pesan” dan “media” yang digunakan dianggap tidak kredibel dan tidak dipercaya oleh komunikan (media massa).[9]

Oleh sebab itu beberapa hal yang perlu diperhatikan adalah:

1. Komunikator (Polri)

Komunikator harus orang yang tepat dan kredibel untuk menyampaikan pesan. Selain pejabat khusus bidang Humas Polri, para pejabat Kepolisian baik Polsek, Polres, Polda maupun Mabes, pada dasarnya adalah ornag – orang yang dipercaya oleh media untuk menyampaikan suatu Pers realease.

1. Pesan yang disampaikan.

Berita yang disampaikan harus tepat waktu, tepat sasaran, akurat dan benar. Walaupun dalam penyampaian informasi, Polri harus menyadari munculnya suasana dilematis yaitu : “yang benar tidak semuanya disampaikan, tetapi yang disampaikan harus benar”. Hal ini menjadikan komunikasi Polri harus dirancang secara tepat dan akurat agar transparansi dan akuntabilitas bisa diterima masyarakat, namun tidak merugikan Polri.

1. Media yang digunakan

Ada beberapa media yang dapat digunakan dalam menyampaikan berita / pesan yaitu:

-        Komunikasi melalui bahan cetak atau tulisan, contoh; Laporan, Press release.

-        Komunikasi melalui peralatan elektronik, contoh; E-mail, Konferensi jarak jauh dengan menggunakan satelit, Faksimile, Website (situs) di internet.

-        Komunikasi secara berhadapan atau face to face, contoh Wawancara, konferensi pers, lobbying.

1. Komunikan (Media Massa)

Kemitraan harus terus dibangun dengan pihak media melalui

-           Membuka Akses Informasi bagi Media.

Akses informasi yang dibuka bagi media dapat dilaksanakan secara langsung maupun tidak langsung dengan memperhatikan ketentuan informasi yang benar dan akurat dengan tidak merugikan kepentingan institusi Polri

-                       Kesetaraan dan Kesejajaran dalam Berkomunikasi.

Polri sebagai institusi yang harus bertanggung jawab kepada publik harus menyampaikan berita secara benar, akurat dan tepat sedangkan media sebagai penyampai informasi meskipun merdeka dan bebas tetap harus bertanggung jawab

1. Tujuan (Effect)

Effek yang diharapakan adalah media mempunyai sikap dan persepsi yang sama dengan Polri, sehingga berita – berita yang diturunkan akan mengangkat opini publik terhadap Polri yang baik dimata masyarakat. Dengan opini yang baik maka kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap Polri akan meningkat.

III.       PENUTUP

1.         Kesimpulan

a.         Opini publik adalah perspektif masyarakat spontan yang mempunyai kepentingan terhadap individu atau kelompok. Media Massa meruapakn ruang publik untuk mendapatkan informasi sehingga pada dasarnya, opini publik merupakan produk Media Massa.

1. Komunikasi efektif tercipta manakala komunikasi dapat mencapai tujuan atau sasaran yang telah ditentukan oleh komunikator .
2. Komunikasi efektif yang terjadi antara Polri dengan Media Massa akan mendorong terjadinya suatu simbiosis mutualisme yang pada akhirnya masing-masing institusi akan bekerja secara profesional sesuai kompetensi yang dimiliki. Sinergitas ini akan mendorong organisasi Polri dalam mewujudkan visi dan misinya melalui opini publik yang positif dan berimbang.

2.         Saran/ Rekomendasi

a.         Divisi Humas Polri harus melakukan peningkatan kemampuan individu dan empowering (pemberdayaan organisasi) secara berkesinambungan untuk mencapai Profesionalitas kehumasan.

b.         Polri perlu merekrut sarjana komunikasi/ publikasi untuk mendukung upaya optimalisasi fungsi Humas dalam pengelolaan dan penyampaian informasi kepada publik

c.         Polri perlu membuka akses bagi publik untuk emeperoleh informasi dengan tetap memperhatikan kepentingan organisasi dan pelaksanaan tugas Polri.

[2] Adiwinoto, Sisno, 2007, Strategi Komunikasi Polri, Bahan Pelajaran Pasis Sespimpol Dikreg-45, Lembang, Sespim Polri.

[3] Opini Publik, dalam http://kuliahkomunikasi.com/?p=26

[4] Rivers, William L, Jay W. Jensen, Theodore Peterson, , Media Massa dan Masyarakat Modern, Edisi Kedua, Jakarta, Kencana. 2003

[5] Ucahjana,.Ilmu, ”Teori dan Filsafat Komunikasi, Bandung” : Citra Aditya Bakti,2000.

[6] Bungin, Burhan., “Sosiologi Komunikasi Teori, Paradigma, dan Dikursus Teknologi Komunikasi Di Masyarakat. Jakarta”, Prenada Media Group. 2006

[7] Wina Puspita Sari, Audit Komunikasi sebagai Alat untuk Mengukur Efektifitas dan Efisiensi Komunikasi dalam Suatu Organisasi, dalam http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:9BSdnwD9wp8J:jurnal.bl.ac.id

[8] Bungin, Burhan., “Sosiologi Komunikasi Teori, Paradigma, dan Dikursus Teknologi Komunikasi Di Masyarakat. Jakarta”, Prenada Media Group. 2006

[9] Lisman Sumarjani, “Komunikasi: Bagaimana Pesan Disampaikan dan mempengaruhi Orang”, Konflik Sosial Kehutanan, http://www.pdf-search-engine.com/komunikasi-efektif-pdf.html